I work at a local ISP in Northern Illinois and have worked in internet infrastructure here for two decades. I co-founded FD-IX, an internet exchange.
TL;DR
- The technical risks the government cited, from route leaks to stolen call records, are not unique to Chinese carriers, and each has operator fixes. The routing fixes are old: RPKI, the signed record of which network may originate which addresses, since 2011; origin validation since 2013; peer locking since 2016. On APNIC Labs’ 28-day average, only 53.1% of US users sit behind networks that drop RPKI-invalid routes [1][2][3][4].
- The CPNI rules require safeguards and passwords for call records, and CALEA’s rules let an intercept be turned on only with lawful authorization and an employee’s intervention [5][6]. The FCC’s advisory council recommended monitoring and filtering signaling traffic in 2017, and CISA recommends end-to-end encrypted apps in place of SMS [7][8]. Carriers have no general FCC duty to secure their networks; in November 2025 the FCC rescinded the post-Salt Typhoon ruling that read one into CALEA. Security requirements come with money or licenses, such as Enhanced A-CAM support, BEAD grants, and international 214s [9][10][11][12].
- What you owe the FCC depends on what you sell, which authorizations you hold, which subsidies you take, and who owns you, not on who you peer with. A facilities-based ISP that sells only broadband owes a CALEA plan and a supply chain report, filed once to certify it has no covered gear or by March 31 each year if it has some; carriers and interconnected VoIP providers also owe a CPNI certificate, and voice providers a Robocall Mitigation Database recertification, by March 1. The general cap on a carrier’s fine is $251,322 per violation or per day [13][14][15][16][17][18][19].
- Foreign-produced consumer routers, including ISP-installed residential gateways and residential LTE and 5G CPE, went on the Covered List on March 23, 2026. Models already authorized stay legal. Foreign-produced gateways without a Conditional Approval that you own and bought on or after May 22, 2026, belong on next March’s supply chain report, and by the rules’ text FCC capital subsidies may not buy or maintain covered gear and BEAD subgrantees may not buy it for funded networks [20][21][22][23][11]. Foreign-produced drones joined the list in December 2025 and power inverters in July 2026 [20].
- A new FCC order adds a one-time filing, 5% ownership reporting, and a cybersecurity certification for every international 214 holder. About 1,235 of roughly 7,000 listed holders answered the last collection, close to the FCC’s estimate of about 1,500 active ones, and the FCC will move to revoke holders that never answered it. An international 214 application or transfer with a foreign owner at 10% or more generally goes to Team Telecom review, and the first enforcement of one of its agreements cost Marlink $175,000 [12][24][25]. Every carrier registered with the FCC as providing interstate telecommunications must also attest whether it is under foreign adversary control once the FCC opens filing under a January 2026 order [26][27].
The risks are technical, and so are the fixes
The companion piece, “The FCC’s Chinese Carrier Bans Never Touched BGP,” shows that pulling a carrier’s license did not change its routing or its PoPs. The technical risks the government named are real, though, and none of them is unique to Chinese carriers: route leaks and hijacks, interception of unencrypted traffic, intrusion through stolen credentials and weak equipment, theft of call records, and abuse of the phone network’s signaling. This piece covers what an operator can run against each, how to work out which FCC rules apply to you, and what those rules require.
Stop leaks and hijacks at your edge
Default deny. RFC 8212, published in July 2017, says a router must not accept or advertise routes on an external BGP session that has no policy applied, though it may let operators turn that off [28].
Filter every customer. Accept from each customer only the prefixes that customer and its own customers hold, built from IRR records and RPKI, and cap every session with a maximum prefix count. MANRS, the industry routing security program, puts it as “ensure the correctness of your own announcements and those from your customers to adjacent networks” [29]. That stops most leaks at the first hop.
Filter at your route servers. If you run an exchange, the MANRS program for exchanges asks you to filter route server announcements against IRR data, RPKI, or both [30].
Create ROAs and drop invalids. Route origin validation drops announcements whose origin does not match a published ROA. Your ROAs let other networks reject hijacks of your space; dropping invalids keeps your customers off hijacked routes to space others have signed.
Check the AS path. The China Telecom detour Doug Madory documented began as a peer leak with the origin unchanged, so origin validation would not have caught it. Filtering by Telia and GTT, the biggest carriers of those routes, cut its reach by 90% [31].
Peer locking. A large network refuses a route from a peer when the path shows another large network that should never sit behind that peer. A 2020 study found 48% of the possible filters of this kind in place among the top transit networks. It estimated that adding a lighter version at all large ISPs, fewer than 1% of networks, would completely stop 80% of simulated leaks of routes that crossed the top transit networks [3]. The lighter version needs no coordination: a network drops routes from its own customers whose path contains a Tier 1 network, which any operator with BGP customers can do [3].
BGP roles. RFC 9234 lets each side of a session declare itself a provider, customer, peer, route server, or route server client, and tags routes with an “Only to Customer” attribute so a router drops a leak on its own [32]. In August 2026, Cloudflare found that Junos, RouterOS, BIRD, OpenBGPD, and FRR support it; Cisco IOS XR has it planned; and Arista, Nokia, and Huawei do not, and that only 36 networks looked compliant [33].
ASPA. A network publishes a signed RPKI object listing its upstream providers, and anyone can check whether a path is plausible. The RIPE NCC enabled it in its RPKI Dashboard on November 26, 2025 [34], ARIN made it fully available in ARIN Online on January 20, 2026 [35], and all five registries committed to support it by the end of 2026 [36]. The path verification standard is still an Internet-Draft before the IESG [37].
Watch your own prefixes. BGPalerter, an open-source tool from NTT, watches public BGP data and alerts when your prefixes are hijacked, lose visibility, show up RPKI-invalid, or take an unexpected path [38]. A leak you see in minutes costs far less than one a customer reports.
Quick Compare: when each tool became available, and who uses it
| Tool | Available since | Latest measure of use |
|---|---|---|
| RPKI ROAs | RIPE NCC Jan 2011; ARIN Sept 2012 | 70.3% of routed prefixes RPKI-valid (Sept 2026) |
| Origin validation | Standardized Jan 2013 | Users behind networks that drop invalids, 28-day average: 31% worldwide, 53% in the US (Nov 2, 2026) |
| MANRS | 2014 | 1,489 participating ASNs; RIPE RIS sees 88,460 ASNs in all (Nov 8, 2026) |
| Peer locking | 2016 | 48% of possible filters among top transit networks (2020) |
| BGP roles | May 2022 | 36 networks look compliant (Aug 2026) |
| ASPA | Internet-Draft; RIPE NCC Nov 2025, ARIN Jan 2026 | 4,072 objects worldwide in the rpki-client console (Nov 11, 2026) |
Sources: [1][39][40][2][41][4][42][43][44][3][32][33][34][35][45]. The origin validation figures are APNIC Labs’ measurement of the share of users whose networks drop RPKI-invalid routes.
The core tools are not new. RPKI had been available for a decade when the FCC voted to revoke China Telecom Americas in October 2021. On APNIC Labs’ 28-day average, 40.5% of US users then sat behind networks that dropped RPKI-invalid routes; the share peaked at 72.7% in October 2024 and was 53.1% on November 2, 2026 [4]. Because the measure counts users, a few large access networks can move it, and it does not show why the share fell. US networks still drop invalid routes more often than the world average [41][4]. On September 28, 2026, 47.9% of US routed IPv4 addresses were in RPKI-valid routes, below the 65.0% worldwide [46]. Without the Department of Defense, which began announcing most of its space in 2021 to watch for misuse, the US figure would be 62%; with it, the US holds 59.1% of the world’s routed IPv4 space outside valid routes [46][40].
The FCC does not require any of this. It proposed in 2024 that every broadband provider write a BGP security plan, with only the largest filing theirs, and as of November 10, 2026, had not adopted the rule; the last FCC document in the docket is a September 2024 notice [47][48].
Assume the path is hostile
Encryption protects content, not metadata. The FCC found that China Telecom Americas’ private lines could give it customers’ content where they had not added end-to-end encryption, and that on its MPLS VPNs it could derive metadata and attempt to decrypt encrypted traffic [49]. Encrypt anything carrying customer data, management traffic, and backhaul between your sites where you can.
Salt Typhoon, the Chinese campaign inside US telecom networks, needed no misroute to get into US carriers’ own network equipment; in most cases it got in with legitimate login credentials [50][51]. An August 2025 advisory from 23 agencies in 13 countries named the flaws these actors exploited in Cisco IOS XE’s web interface (CVE-2023-20198 and CVE-2023-20273), Cisco Smart Install (CVE-2018-0171), Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2024-21887), and Palo Alto GlobalProtect (CVE-2024-3400). Once in, they added addresses to ACLs, built GRE tunnels, opened nonstandard ports, and captured TACACS+ and RADIUS traffic [51]. Patching those five flaws and turning off Smart Install come first.
In December 2024, CISA, NSA, FBI, and their Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand counterparts published hardening guidance for exactly this [52]. Keep every edge device patched and track end-of-life dates. Turn off Telnet, FTP, TFTP, HTTP management, and SNMP v1 and v2c, and use SSH v2, TLS 1.3, and SNMPv3 instead. Use phishing-resistant multifactor authentication and centralized AAA, and keep local accounts for emergencies only. Manage devices from a separate out-of-band network, never from the internet, behind default-deny access lists. Centralize logs off the device, keep an inventory of devices and firmware, and check software images against the vendor’s published hashes.
None of this is an FCC requirement, with one narrow exception. After Salt Typhoon, the FCC ruled in January 2025 that CALEA “affirmatively requires telecommunications carriers” to secure their networks; in November 2025 it rescinded that ruling and withdrew its proposal for cybersecurity plans, pointing to carriers’ voluntary commitments and to the incident-reporting rules CISA must write under a 2022 law [9]. The exception covers alerting gear, and since September 29, 2026, EAS Participants, including cable systems and wireline video providers, must use strong passwords or another authentication measure, install security patches promptly, and firewall or segment remote management on their EAS equipment, studio-transmitter links, and any remotely managed gear that routes, processes, or inserts content into their programming [53]. Enhanced A-CAM carriers had to file cybersecurity and supply chain risk management plans with USAC, with 25% of monthly support withheld until they do [10]. BEAD subgrantees must attest to having cybersecurity and supply chain risk management plans in place or ready to put into operation [11]. FCC 26-74 has international 214 holders certify that their cybersecurity programs follow an established risk management framework, such as NIST’s, and recognized best practices [12].
Protect call records, intercepts and signaling
Call records and account data. The FBI and CISA said in November 2024 that the intruders stole customer call records [54]. The CPNI rules require carriers to take reasonable measures to discover and protect against attempts at unauthorized access, a duty that reaches intruders, but their specific steps guard against pretexters. Carriers must authenticate customers before disclosing CPNI, and they may give out call detail on a customer-initiated call only if the customer supplies a password not prompted by readily available biographical or account information, and otherwise only by mail to the address of record or by calling the number of record. For business customers with a dedicated account representative and a contract that specifically addresses CPNI protection, carriers may agree to a different authentication regime [5]. Salt Typhoon breached carriers that were subject to those rules. Recent Team Telecom agreements also require screening of personnel with access to domestic network infrastructure and reports on non-US citizens with access to it or to US records [12]. The systems that hold call records need the same protection as the management plane above.
Lawful intercept systems. The same intrusions copied “certain information that was subject to U.S. law enforcement requests pursuant to court orders” [54]. CALEA’s rules already require carriers to ensure that an interception “can be activated only in accordance with a court order or other lawful authorization and with the affirmative intervention of an individual officer or employee of the carrier” [6]. Those systems deserve the hardening above before anything else.
Calls and texts in transit. CISA’s guidance for highly targeted people, which it says applies to all audiences, tells them to use only end-to-end encrypted apps such as Signal, enroll FIDO phishing-resistant authentication, stop using SMS as a second factor, and set a telco PIN. SMS messages are not encrypted, it notes, so an attacker with access to a provider’s network can read them [8]. The FCC has set no compliance date for its 2023 rules requiring mobile carriers to authenticate customers before SIM changes and number ports [5][55]. A provider can help by offering every customer an account PIN that guards logins and number ports.
Signaling. Monitor and filter signaling traffic, with firewalls where needed. The FCC’s advisory council recommended that for SS7 in 2017, along with signaling aggregators and threat sharing, and similar steps for Diameter in 2018 [7][56]. In 2024, the FCC asked carriers how far they had gone [57]. The companion piece covers the 2018 signaling attacks on US subscribers.
Work out what applies to you
The FCC’s security rules attach to what you sell, which authorizations you hold, which subsidies you take, and who owns you. Start by classifying each service. The rules treat four kinds differently: telecommunications service sold as common carriage; broadband internet access, which the Sixth Circuit held is an information service; interconnected VoIP; and calls you carry for other providers [58][17][13][18]. The class decides the rules. A facilities-based ISP that sells only broadband, for example, owes a CALEA plan and the supply chain report but not the CPNI certificate, which covers carriers and interconnected VoIP providers [13][15][17].
Then list what you hold. Every domestic interstate common carrier has blanket 214 authority without applying for it [59]. Search the FCC’s International Communications Filing System for any international 214 in your company’s name [60], and look up your company in the FCC’s Form 499 Filer Database, which shows the communications type and the states it reported to USAC [61]. The FCC will use those registrations to find blanket 214 holders for its new foreign adversary attestation [26]. The attestation asks whether you are under foreign adversary control. Among other ties, the rule counts a company headquartered or organized in a foreign adversary country, and generally one in which such a company, an agent of the adversary, or a citizen of that country who is not a US citizen or permanent resident holds 10% or more of the voting or equity interest [62]. The attestation form, FCC Form 5655, went to OMB for approval in October; public comments are due November 18 [63].
Quick Compare: which security rules apply to you
| If you | You owe | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Sell telecom service as a common carrier | CPNI certificate by March 1; CALEA plan; customer notice and an FCC application before you discontinue a service | [16][6][64][65] |
| Provide interconnected VoIP | CPNI certificate; CALEA plan; Robocall Mitigation Database filing and March 1 recertification; STIR/SHAKEN: sign calls you originate, verify calls you terminate | [17][13][18][66] |
| Provide broadband over your own facilities | CALEA plan | [13] |
| Run a cable or wireline video system or a broadcast station (an EAS Participant) | Strong passwords or another authentication measure, prompt security patches, and a firewall or comparable segmentation for EAS gear | [53] |
| Provide advanced communications service (200 kbps or more) | Supply chain report: once to certify you have no covered gear, or by March 31 each year if you have some | [15][14] |
| Carry calls as a gateway or intermediate provider | Robocall Mitigation Database filing; accept calls directly only from listed providers; STIR/SHAKEN: get your own token and certificate, pass signed calls on unaltered, gateways sign unsigned SIP calls with US numbers in the caller ID, and other intermediate providers sign unsigned SIP calls received directly from originating providers | [18][67] |
| Hold an international 214 | Certifications and 30-day updates; approval before a transfer of control; the new one-time filing | [68][69][70][12] |
| Seek or transfer an international 214 with a foreign owner at 10% or more | Team Telecom referral, with some exclusions | [24][68] |
| Hold domestic or international 214 authority, an ETC designation or a 4G or 5G geographic wireless license | Foreign adversary control attestation once the FCC opens filing; small entities get 120 days | [26][27] |
| Take FCC subsidies for capital spending | No covered equipment or services bought or maintained with them | [23] |
| Take Enhanced A-CAM support | Cybersecurity and supply chain risk management plans filed with USAC | [10] |
| Build with BEAD money | Cybersecurity and supply chain plans; no Covered List equipment | [11][71] |
| Spend any federal grant or loan | None of it on Huawei, ZTE or covered video surveillance gear | [72] |
| Sell to federal agencies | No covered telecom gear as a substantial or essential part of any system | [73] |
The table covers the rules in this piece, not other FCC filings such as the Broadband Data Collection or universal service contributions.
What you are liable for. For a common carrier, the FCC’s general maximum forfeiture is $251,322 per violation or per day of a continuing violation, up to $2,513,215 for one continuing violation. For broadcasters and cable operators, it is $62,829 per violation or day, up to $628,305, and for other providers, in cases the rule does not cover elsewhere, $25,132, up to $188,491 [19]. The FCC left these 2025 amounts in place for 2026 [74]. The FCC’s base amounts include $10,000 for false or inaccurate information in the Robocall Mitigation Database and $1,000 for failing to update a filing within 10 business days, both assessed daily until cured [75], $8,000 for an unauthorized substantial transfer of control, and $3,000 for failing to file required forms or information. A provider found to have failed to block illegal robocalls under the call-acceptance or call-blocking rules faces up to $25,132 per call [19]. A de-listed provider loses more: other providers must not accept its calls directly [18]. Officers sign the Robocall Mitigation Database certifications under the FCC’s rule for declarations under penalty of perjury [18][76].
In June 2026, the Supreme Court, 8-1, upheld the FCC’s forfeiture process against AT&T’s and Verizon’s jury-trial challenge, in cases over fines of about $57 million and $47 million for failing to protect customer location data. Fines that large sum many separate violations, since no single violation can pass the cap. A forfeiture order does not itself oblige payment; the government “cannot collect before it successfully proves its case to a jury” [77].
CPNI. An officer must sign the certificate and state personal knowledge that the company’s operating procedures are adequate to ensure compliance. It goes to the Enforcement Bureau by March 1 with a statement explaining how those procedures ensure that the company is or is not in compliance, any actions taken against data brokers, and a summary of the past year’s customer complaints about unauthorized release of CPNI [16]. The rules reach interconnected VoIP providers as well as carriers [17]. Under the breach rule in force, which covers CPNI, a carrier notifies the Secret Service and FBI through the central reporting facility the FCC links to within seven business days of determining a breach, then waits seven full business days before telling customers, longer if the investigating agency orders a delay and less only if an urgent need justifies it after consulting the agency, and keeps records for two years [78]. The FCC adopted a broader rule in 2023 covering other personal data, with a 30-day customer deadline, and its Federal Register notice delayed those amendments indefinitely [79]. In July 2026, the full Sixth Circuit agreed to rehear the industry challenge to the order [80].
CALEA. In 2005 the FCC extended CALEA, which has its own definition of a telecommunications carrier, to facilities-based broadband providers and interconnected VoIP [13]. That means appointing a senior officer or employee responsible for lawful intercepts, written policies that include a 24-hour law enforcement contact, and reporting any compromise of an intercept to the affected agencies [6]. File the policies, which the FCC calls a System Security and Integrity (SSI) plan, through the FCC’s CALEA Electronic Filing System before you start service and within 90 days of a merger, divestiture, or change to them [64][13]. The filing is not the whole duty: you also need a way to carry out intercepts, built yourself or bought from your equipment vendor or a trusted third party, and you stay responsible either way [13].
Supply chain report. It applies to any provider of advanced communications service, which the FCC defines as 200 kbps or more in either direction [14]. Covered gear obtained 60 days or more after it is added to the list must be reported [14]. A provider with none files once to certify that, then stops until it obtains covered gear [15]. The FCC’s 2026 reminder confirms that a provider that so certified in its last report need not file for 2025 unless it has since obtained listed gear [14].
Robocall Mitigation Database. Voice service, gateway, and intermediate providers must file in the database, update a filing within 10 business days of a change, and recertify every year by March 1 [18][81]. A voice service provider’s filing states its STIR/SHAKEN status, describes how it avoids originating illegal robocalls, including how it vets customers and upstream providers, and commits it to answer traceback requests within 24 hours [18].
STIR/SHAKEN. A voice service provider must get its own SPC token and certificate and sign the SIP calls it originates. A third party may sign for you only with your certificate, you must make the attestation decisions, and the agreement must be in writing and kept for two years after it ends [66]. Continuing exceptions cover a provider that cannot get a token under the governance authority’s policy, small providers that originate calls by satellite, and the parts of a network that cannot carry SIP calls, which follow a separate rule for non-IP networks [82].
Numbering. The FCC’s tentative agenda for its meeting on November 19, 2026, includes “Securing Phone Numbers Against National Security Threats,” rules for interconnected VoIP providers with direct access to numbers [83][84]. The public draft would require existing holders to certify, within 30 days of the FCC announcing OMB approval, that they are not on the Covered List and do not use equipment or services from listed producers, or to explain, and that they have never been denied a 214 or had one revoked on national security or law enforcement grounds [84]. The draft can change before the vote.
The router listing reaches ISP-installed gateways
Foreign-produced consumer routers, including residential gateways that ISPs install, have been on the Covered List since March 23, 2026, when the FCC added “Routers produced in a foreign country, except routers which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS” [20]. The definition comes from NIST: “consumer-grade networking devices that are primarily intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer” [21]. By the FCC’s FAQ, the definition takes in consumer and small-business routers sold or rented at retail, consumer hotspots, residential LTE and 5G CPE, residential routers installed by a professional or an ISP, and residential gateways that combine a modem and a router. ONTs, ATAs, femtocells, phones with hotspot features, and industrial, enterprise, or military equipment fall outside it [21]. The FAQ does not mention fixed wireless CPE; for devices it does not list, it points back to the NIST report, IR 8425A, and its appendix on how consumer-grade devices are acquired [21]. “Produced” includes design and assembly as well as manufacturing [21]. The FCC’s fact sheet says foreign-made routers “were also involved in the Volt, Flax, and Salt Typhoon cyberattacks targeting vital U.S. infrastructure” [85].
The direct effect is on new models: a foreign-produced model cannot get FCC authorization without a Conditional Approval. Models already authorized remain legal to import, sell, and use [21][85], and can still get basic software and firmware updates under a waiver [21]. The FCC’s list of approvals already includes lines from Calix, Adtran, Nokia, eero, Netgear and others, each with an end date [20]. A model authorized while its approval is in force stays legal to import and sell after the approval ends [21]. By the FAQ’s answer, an ISP that only buys CPE has no path to a Conditional Approval: asked about service providers that buy routers, it says any entity that takes part in producing one may apply [21].
FCC subsidy money for capital spending may not buy, rent, or lease covered equipment, or maintain covered equipment already obtained, starting 60 days after it is listed [23]. For routers, that date was May 22, 2026. The supply chain report counts covered gear obtained on or after that date [14], and the FCC’s instructions for the last report counted CPE the provider owns, including CPE leased to customers or held in inventory, as covered equipment [22]. By those instructions, a foreign-produced residential gateway without a Conditional Approval that you own and bought on or after May 22, 2026, goes on next March’s report. By the subsidy rule’s text, FCC capital subsidy money also may not buy such a gateway or, from May 22, maintain one, whenever it was bought. The FCC’s router FAQ does not address the subsidy rule, so ask the FCC before you draw subsidy funds for CPE.
BEAD has its own version. NTIA bars subgrantees from buying “covered communications equipment” when deploying funded networks, and the Secure Networks Act defines that as anything on the Covered List [11][71]. By that definition, the bar also reaches foreign-produced residential gateways without a Conditional Approval; NTIA has not addressed them. The same guidance bars buying fiber optic cable and optical transmission equipment made in China [11].
Foreign-produced drones and their critical components went on the list in December 2025, with exceptions, and foreign-produced power inverters and advanced robotic devices in July 2026. In August, the FCC narrowed the inverter entry to grid-tied units with components for remote communication or control [20][86]. The supply chain report asks about covered equipment obtained 60 days or more after it is listed, but the rule’s reporting details speak of equipment “in its network” and its no-covered-gear certification of equipment “in the network of such provider,” and the FCC has not said whether a drone bought for tower work or an inverter for a site’s solar array counts [14][15].
The certifications in the new 214 order and the numbering draft cover only equipment listed by producer, such as Huawei or ZTE, not product classes like routers [12][84].
If you hold an international 214
An international 214 carries the obligations below whether you use it or not.
International 214 applicants today agree to comply with CALEA, to make communications and records available in a form and location that US legal process can reach, to name a point of contact in the US who is a citizen or permanent resident, and to report changes within 30 days. They acknowledge that breaking those commitments or giving the government materially false information can bring revocation and criminal and civil penalties [68]. The new one-time filing asks existing holders for certifications consistent with these application rules [12].
Once authorized, a holder has 30 days to correct any certification that becomes inaccurate, to notify the FCC when a wholly owned subsidiary starts providing service under its authority, and to report a name change [69]. Selling the company or changing control needs prior FCC approval; a pro forma change needs a notice within 30 days after it closes [70]. Discontinuing international service needs 30 days’ written notice to customers [87].
FCC 26-74, released November 5, 2026, requires every holder to complete a one-time filing, with a deadline no fewer than 60 days after the collection takes effect, which the FCC will announce in the Federal Register after OMB review [12]. It requires disclosure of owners at 5% and up, with a tailored exception for US publicly traded companies, and reports of material changes within 30 days [12]. Holders must also certify that they will not add Covered List equipment or services from listed producers and that their cybersecurity programs follow a recognized framework; a program built on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and incorporating CISA’s performance goals or the CIS Controls presumptively meets that requirement [12]. The filing asks for details of any facility crossing into Canada or Mexico over land, and the FCC says it may refer an applicant with such a crossing to Team Telecom [12].
Holders that never answered the one-time collection due January 22, 2024, face revocation; those that answered late do not. The order treats their silence as “presumptive evidence that the authorization holder is no longer in operation,” lists them in the Federal Register with 30 days to respond or surrender, then gives 15 more days before revoking [12]. A holder can skip the new filing by surrendering all its authorizations, by letter in ICFS, before its deadline [12].
If you have foreign owners or staff
When review starts. Team Telecom is the executive branch committee chaired by the Attorney General with Defense and Homeland Security as members [88]. The FCC generally refers an international 214 application or transfer to it when the applicant has a foreign owner at 10% or more [24][68]. The new order lowers the disclosure line to 5% once its rule changes take effect, but keeps 10% as the referral line [12]. Pro forma filings, foreign ownership held only through wholly owned intermediate holding companies under ultimate US ownership and control, applicants with an existing agreement and no new foreign owners, and applicants reviewed in the past 18 months that drew no request for an agreement and have no new foreign owners since are generally excluded if the application shows it [24].
How it runs. You answer the committee’s standard questions before or when you file and send it a complete copy of the application within three business days [89]. The committee then has 120 days from the date its chair deems your answers to its follow-up questions complete, plus a possible 90-day secondary review, and it can extend both [90]. It can clear the application, ask the FCC to condition it on a mitigation agreement, or recommend denial [90].
What agreements require. The FCC’s description of recent letters of agreement with Zayo, Consolidated Communications, T-Mobile, and others lists the usual terms [12]. They require prior notice and approval of “principal equipment” from suppliers tied to a foreign adversary or on the Covered List, initial and annual reports on principal equipment and on non-US citizens with access to US records or domestic infrastructure, a process to screen personnel with access to that infrastructure, and cybersecurity plans [12].
What breaking one costs. Marlink, a satellite operator, agreed in 2022 to notify DOJ before giving foreign employees access and failed to submit at least 186 of them for vetting. It agreed to pay $175,000 in the first enforcement of a Team Telecom agreement [25]. T-Mobile paid CFIUS, the interagency committee that reviews foreign investment, $60 million in 2024 for failing to prevent and promptly report unauthorized access to sensitive data under its national security agreement [91].
Foreign ownership by itself is not disqualifying; the FCC licenses carriers owned by other governments [92]. In July 2026, the FCC denied an applicant it found under Chinese government control through its majority owner, a Chinese citizen, while saying citizenship alone is not disqualifying [93].
Your suppliers, your federal customers and your peers
Federal customers. If you sell to a federal agency, FAR 52.204-25 bars the agency from contracting with a company that uses “covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system,” and the bar applies “regardless of whether that use is in performance of work under a Federal contract.” The clause defines covered gear chiefly by reference to Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua, and their affiliates. It does not cover a service that connects to a third party’s facilities, “such as backhaul, roaming, or interconnection arrangements,” or equipment that cannot route traffic or see user data. Finding such gear starts a one-business-day report and a 10-business-day mitigation report [73].
The Justice Department’s Data Security Program, in force since April 8, 2025, bars brokering bulk US sensitive personal data or government-related data to China or five other countries of concern, or to their covered persons. It allows vendor, employment, and investment agreements that give them access only under CISA security requirements and the rule’s other conditions. It exempts data transactions ordinarily incident to telecommunications service, which it defines to include “arrangements for network interconnection, transport, messaging, routing,” except data brokerage [94].
Peers. No FCC rule requires you to drop a BGP session with anyone named on the Covered List today. The list’s entries for China Telecom Americas, China Unicom Americas, China Mobile International USA and Pacific Networks name only their “telecommunications services … subject to section 214” [20], and the FCC has said BGP routing is not one [49]. FCC 26-29 asks whether carriers should be barred from interconnecting with Covered List companies, including at their PoPs and data centers [95]. NTCA, which represents rural broadband providers, warned that such a ban, without a clear determination of risk to national security, “would impose a significant burden on small carriers,” and that the proposal never says whether it reaches peering, transit, cloud services or CDNs [96]. ITI, a technology industry group, told the FCC that cutting an interconnection does not remove the traffic; it forces it onto longer, less secure paths [97]. The NPRM also asks whether every holder of an authorization covered by the foreign adversary rules, which includes every carrier registered as providing interstate telecommunications, should be barred from “any transaction or other dealings” in the US with the Covered List carriers whose international 214s were revoked or denied [95][26].
If a carrier you buy from is revoked. In its 2022 revocations, the FCC gave China Unicom Americas and Pacific Networks 60 days from the order to stop service and required at least 30 days’ notice to customers [98][99]. A future order would set its own deadline; those gave customers 30 to 60 days to move circuits and numbers. For Covered List companies whose blanket domestic authority it would revoke, FCC 26-29 floats six months [95].
What to do this quarter
Start with the filings that carry deadlines and penalties: confirm whether you hold an international 214 and answer the one-time filing when it opens, or surrender it; make sure your CALEA plan is on file and current; calendar March 1 for CPNI and the Robocall Mitigation Database and March 31 for the supply chain report; and watch for the FCC to open its foreign adversary attestation. Then check your CPE line for foreign-produced residential gateways without a Conditional Approval before you buy more with subsidy or BEAD money, and add drones and inverters to the supply chain check. On the network, patch the five flaws in the August 2025 advisory, turn on default deny and customer prefix filters, publish ROAs and ASPA records (ASPA path checks are still a draft standard), drop RPKI invalids, enable BGP roles where your gear supports them, and run a prefix monitor. Lock down your lawful intercept systems, call records, and management plane, and offer customers account PINs. Put a written clause in supplier and peering contracts that lets you exit if the other side lands on the Covered List. None of this depends on who owns your peers. The network steps protect you from the risks the license fight was supposed to address, and the filings keep you on the right side of the FCC.
Cover photo: Fabienne Serriere / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0, cropped
Sources
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- 47 CFR 1.40003 (Categories of information to be provided to the executive branch agencies), as in force Nov 2026 (Cornell LII copy of the eCFR text). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/47/1.40003
- 47 CFR 1.40004 (Time frames for executive branch review), as in force Nov 2026 (Cornell LII copy of the eCFR text). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/47/1.40004
- Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Enforcement (2024 penalty, T-Mobile US, Inc.). https://cfius.gov/monitoring-enforcement/enforcement/
- FCC, China Mobile International (USA) Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 19-38 (May 2019), para. 20. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-38A1.pdf
- FCC, Digitalsystem Technology Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 26-44 (adopted June 30, released July 7, 2026), paras. 1, 4, 10 and 14. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-44A1.pdf
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- FCC, Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 26-29, WC Docket No. 26-82 (adopted Apr 30, 2026), paras. 12, 14 and 16. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-29A1.pdf
- NTCA, Comments, WC Docket No. 26-82 (June 8, 2026). https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/1060873258429/1
- ITI, Comments, WC Docket No. 26-82 (June 8, 2026). https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/106081773002043/1
- FCC, China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Order on Revocation, FCC 22-9 (released Feb 2, 2022), para. 130. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-9A1.pdf
- FCC, Pacific Networks Corp. and ComNet (USA) LLC, Order on Revocation and Termination, FCC 22-22 (Mar 2022), para. 158. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-22A1.pdf
