Mike Hammett

How things actually work.

Tag: Internet Routing

  • The FCC’s Chinese Carrier Bans Never Touched BGP

    The FCC’s Chinese Carrier Bans Never Touched BGP

    I work at a local ISP in Northern Illinois and have worked in internet infrastructure here for two decades. I co-founded FD-IX, an internet exchange. Before I joined, DNA Communications, where I am now CTO, bought IP transit from PCCW Global from 2008 to 2010.

    TL;DR

    • The FCC pulled Chinese carriers’ US licenses with section 214, a Title II telephone law, while saying in the same order that BGP routing, how networks tell each other which addresses they can reach, “is not a service subject to section 214 authority” [1].
    • In RIPE RIS, the RIPE NCC’s public collection of routing data, China Telecom Americas and China Unicom Americas still show the same four upstream neighbors each, and the international networks of China Telecom, China Unicom and China Mobile have two to three times as many BGP neighbors as when the FCC acted. Over the same years, ten other international carriers ranged from 35% fewer neighbors to 39% more [8][9][10].
    • Revocation ended China Telecom Americas’ authority to sell the private lines and VPNs behind the FCC’s passive-monitoring finding as common carriage. Its website offered them in the US until mid-2023; when its sales ended is not public. China Mobile’s US arm, which never held a license, sold or resold private lines and VPNs in 2025. China Telecom Americas’ routing stayed, and so did ten of its US PoPs, down from 23 in 2021 [1][3][64][65].
    • The revocations rested on state ownership, findings that the companies could not be trusted and, for China Telecom, Pacific Networks and ComNet, broken security agreements. Other breaches of security agreements, by companies no foreign adversary controls, ended in payments: Marlink, a satellite operator, agreed to pay $175,000 to settle with the FCC, and CFIUS fined T-Mobile $60 million [1][17][18][24][36].
    • In January 2025, the Sixth Circuit set aside the FCC’s 2024 broadband order, which claimed power over whom ISPs exchange traffic with. The FCC’s last document on its 2024 BGP proposal is a September 2024 notice. Its newest rule maps land crossings to Canada and Mexico and filters nothing, and its pending interconnection proposal never mentions peering or IP transit [2][7][19][22][42][50].

    Section 214 is a telephone law, not a BGP rule

    Washington used telephone law against Chinese carriers it describes in internet terms: hijacked routes, traffic detoured through China, points of presence inside US networks. Section 214 sits in Title II of the Communications Act, the common-carrier rules written for the phone network. It licenses carriers to provide regulated telecom service.

    The FCC knows the difference. Its 2021 order against China Telecom Americas says “while interdomain routing, as supported by BGP, is not a service subject to section 214 authority, it is critical in supporting various services that may require such authority” [1]. In the same order, it says “forwarding of IP traffic and BGP routing do not require section 214 authority and could continue to be offered by CTA or CT irrespective of section 214 authority” [1]. Then it devotes a paragraph to BGP hijacking and route leaks as evidence in the case for revocation, not as something revocation would fix, noting that new tools make detecting false origins “increasingly feasible, but their deployment is limited” [1].

    What the revocations actually rested on

    The FCC denied China Mobile USA an international license in 2019 [4]. In 2021, it revoked China Telecom Americas’ domestic and international authority on ownership, candor, and compliance findings, and in 2022 it revoked the authority of China Unicom Americas, Pacific Networks, and ComNet [1][36][24]. HKT and PCCW agreed in October 2026 to exit all 214 services by September 1, 2027, with no admission and no finding against them; the decree says nothing about PCCW Global’s IP transit or peering [5].

    The FCC terminated China Telecom Americas’ international authority on its “willful violation of two of the five provisions” of a 2007 letter of assurances with the Executive Branch agencies [1]. It also found inaccurate statements to the Commission and other agencies, and noncompliance with its requirements for international signaling point codes, the SS7 gateway addresses its International Bureau reclaimed in November 2020 [1]. The D.C. Circuit held that the agreement breach “independently supports” revocation [14].

    China Unicom Americas, which had no security agreement to break, lost its authority on state ownership, Chinese law obligating its parents to cooperate with the government, a lack of candor, and a finding that mitigation would not work [36]. The Ninth Circuit upheld the revocation 2-1 in December 2024, over a dissent arguing the Act gives the FCC no power to revoke a 214 on its own [37]. Pacific Networks and ComNet lost theirs on similar grounds plus a breach of their 2009 letter of assurances, and the D.C. Circuit upheld the revocation in August 2023 [24][38].

    Those findings are real. The harms the FCC tied to the license itself fall on the license’s own customers. CTExcel, China Telecom Americas’ mobile reseller, held US subscriber records and SIM provisioning [1]. It had to stop service by January 3, 2022 [16]. The FCC also listed international private lines and MPLS VPNs among the services that “appear to be offered pursuant to CTA’s section 214 authority” [1]. With those, the FCC said, the company “can monitor, observe, and collect traffic sent to and/or from its customers,” including content on private lines where customers had not added their own end-to-end encryption [1]. And the Executive Branch agencies warned that, through least-cost routing, US agencies’ international calls could cross a licensed carrier’s network even when the agencies were not its customers [4].

    For Pacific Networks and ComNet, the FCC said outright that the companies “appear not to have the ability to misroute communications using Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).” Its concern was their ability to “access, monitor, store, and in some cases disrupt and/or misroute U.S. communications” [24].

    The government-calls risk is the weakest of these. Least-cost routing can send a government call bound for an ally across a Chinese carrier that no agency chose, but that is a procurement problem. The government can write a clause into the carrier contracts it already pays for that bars those carriers from handing its calls to a named network. It already bars contractors that rely on Huawei or ZTE gear in any of their systems, even outside government work, so the clause would be one more term of the same kind [70]. The customer-data risk is narrower than it sounds: CTExcel marketed to Chinese Americans, Chinese students and visitors, and Chinese enterprises, people who chose a carrier owned by the Chinese state. The private-line risk falls on enterprises that bought circuits from a Chinese state carrier and sent traffic over them unencrypted. As for calls to China, Chinese carriers were always going to handle them, and the FCC itself said US customers “generally have many low-cost options for international calls, including to China” [1].

    What the revocations left untouched

    I pulled RIPE RIS data for every licensed company and for each group’s international network, and apart from ComNet, the networks kept their BGP neighbors. RIS sees an adjacency only when paths reach its collectors, so it cannot show that a link is gone.

    Quick Compare: the licensed companies’ own networks (RIPE RIS)

    NetworkASNUpstream neighbors at revocationNov 2026
    China Telecom AmericasAS36678Lumen, Arelion, ChinaNet, CN2Same four
    China Unicom AmericasAS19174Cogent, Lumen, Verizon, China UnicomSame four
    ComNetAS14923Cogent, GTT, CITICSame three in Dec 2022; gone by mid-2023

    Quick Compare: the groups’ international networks (RIPE RIS neighbor counts)

    NetworkASNWhen the FCC acted2026
    China Telecom GlobalAS23764215 (Oct 2021)641 (Nov)
    China Unicom GlobalAS10099128 (Jan 2022)277 (Nov)
    China Mobile InternationalAS58453247 (May 2019)707 (Nov)
    PCCW GlobalAS3491725 (Oct 2025)692 (Nov)

    Sources: [8][9][10][25][26][55]. Upstream neighbors are RIS’s left neighbors, the networks that pass each company’s routes toward the collectors; RIS does not say which are transit providers and which are peers. ComNet and Pacific Networks named their ASNs in their own 2021 filing; since April 2024, ARIN has listed ComNet’s under a different company, Graham Technology Solutions. Pacific Networks said AS4058 belonged to a wholesale customer, which PeeringDB lists as CITIC Telecom International CPC; that network had 57 neighbors at revocation and 69 now [25][26]. The counts in the second table are global and move from week to week; China Mobile International’s was 995 on September 25. The rise far outpaces RIS’s own growth and that of other carriers: RIS had 576 IPv4 peers in May 2019, 765 in October 2021 and 786 in November 2026, and over the same periods NTT, Tata, Telstra, GTT, KDDI, KT, Singtel, HGC, Sparkle and Arelion, most of them far larger, ranged from 35% fewer neighbors to 39% more [10].

    China Telecom Americas did shrink. It originated 15 prefixes at revocation and five now, all valid under RPKI, the system that records which network may originate a block of addresses [10]. It went from 23 US points of presence in 2021 [1] to ten across seven metro areas in the records it gave the House committee in 2025, and it told the committee it has “free peering arrangements in the U.S. with major ISPs” [3]. Settlement-free peering is not a common-carrier telecom service, and the FCC said BGP routing could continue “irrespective of section 214 authority” [1].

    Losing the license did not end those arrangements. The parent’s backbone, ChinaNet (AS4134), had adjacencies with Cogent, Lumen, Hurricane Electric, NTT America, GTT, Zayo, Verizon, Arelion and Tata at the 2021 vote and still has them [10]. ComNet’s routes stayed up with the same upstreams for most of a year after its revocation and were gone by mid-2023. A House select committee put it plainly in 2026: existing law “did not require them to remove infrastructure or terminate peering or interconnection relationships” [3].

    The advertising outlasted the license. In December 2021, China Telecom Americas told the FCC it would keep offering its business services “on a private-carrier basis” after the deadline, and Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel replied that staff would “pursue all available remedies” [62][63]. Whether a service is private carriage is, the FCC says, “a fact-based inquiry”: section 214 reaches telecom offered to the public or to classes of users broad enough to make it effectively public, and “minor differences in price or other terms of service” do not make it private [19]. Archived copies of its product pages offered US coverage for private lines and IP-VPN as late as May 2023 [64]. Since a mid-2023 redesign, they have said “Coverage not available in US,” and the IP-VPN page adds that a carrier-built MPLS VPN “is not available in the US” [39][64]. I found no public record of when its US sales of those services ended. The House committee called a 214 order “strictly a commercial sales license” [3].

    The orders’ strongest internet claim, the passive-monitoring finding, is about those services, not BGP. It covered traffic sent to or from the company’s own customers on them; for MPLS VPNs, it added that the company could derive metadata and attempt to decrypt encrypted traffic [1]. Revocation did not close every PoP: China Telecom Americas still reported ten in 2025, and China Mobile International’s US arm, denied a license in 2019, lists “39 U.S. PoP entries” [3]. A PoP sees the traffic routed to it or through it, nothing else.

    The FCC knows the business continued. In March 2025, Chairman Carr opened an investigation into Covered List companies, saying there was “reason to believe” some were “continuing to do business in America on a private or ‘unregulated’ basis” [48]. China Telecom Americas said as much in its June 2026 comments: since revocation, it has provided “a more limited set of information and private carrier services,” and it is “peered with more than 30 Tier 1 and Tier 2 U.S. ISPs” [49]. It told the House committee it “currently provides exclusively enterprise and carrier business services in the U.S.” [3]. China Unicom Americas told the FCC its services “are limited to internet interconnection” and that it “no longer routes or transmits telecommunications traffic within or through the United States” [53].

    In June 2025, the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau cited China Mobile International’s US arm for incomplete answers about its US business. The company “sells or resells” international Ethernet private lines, MPLS VPNs, IP transit and dedicated internet access, the Bureau wrote, and because it holds no FCC authorization, the law required a citation before any fine [65].

    Stretching phone law over the internet, for everyone

    The FCC’s next answers aimed at every US broadband provider, through the same telephone law.

    The 2024 Open Internet order reclassified broadband as a Title II telecommunications service. Among its stated benefits: it “will enable the Commission to exercise authority when necessary to prohibit a BIAS provider from exchanging internet traffic with third parties that present threats to U.S. national security and law enforcement, such as CTA” [6]. The Sixth Circuit held that broadband is “only an ‘information service’” and set the whole order aside on January 2, 2025 [7].

    The 2024 BGP rulemaking proposed routing security plans for broadband providers and rested on the same footing: Title II, wireless license conditions, section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) [22]. Title II is gone. In 2025, the FCC called its own January 2025 CALEA ruling “unlawful” because it adopted “an erroneously broad reading of section 105 of CALEA” [23]. As of November 10, 2026, the FCC’s last document in that rulemaking is a September 2024 notice on ex parte rules [50].

    The 2026 interconnection proposal, FCC 26-29, tries again. It concedes that IP-based services and facilities “are not covered by section 214(a) as currently interpreted, except as specifically extended by the Commission through additional authority” [2]. Its first proposal would strip blanket domestic 214 authority from every Covered List company and its current and future affiliates; the 2021 and 2022 revocations had left the affiliates’ authority in place [2]. The FCC grants that section 214 “generally addresses only common carrier telecommunications services,” so that proposal alone would not end anyone’s peering [2]. Then it asks whether carriers should be barred from interconnecting with Covered List companies, including at “Points of Presence (PoPs) and data centers,” tentatively calling such interconnection an unreasonable practice under section 201(b) and reading the section 251(a) duty to interconnect as not reaching them, without mentioning peering or IP transit [2][42]. CTIA, the wireless industry’s trade group, told the FCC that peering and transit at PoPs “fall outside the scope of Section 201” [41]. China Telecom Americas argued there is “no evidence that an entity on the Covered List has any means of affecting the networks with which it is interconnected, or their customers” [49].

    The international 214 order, adopted October 29 and released November 5, 2026, follows the same habit [19]. It rests on section 214(a) and (c), which let the FCC put conditions on a carrier’s license; on section 201(b), which bans unjust and unreasonable carrier practices; and on section 4(i), the FCC’s general powers [19]. CTIA, Verizon and others objected that collecting information on facilities used for non-common-carrier services exceeds section 214. The FCC answered that it “is not directly regulating non-common carrier services, but rather, is requiring this information in connection with its regulation of common carrier services” [19]. The phone license is the hook again.

    The order requires applicants for facilities-based authority, and every existing holder through a one-time filing, to report each facility that crosses “the U.S.-Mexico border or U.S.-Canada border over land.” That includes the IP prefixes and AS numbers it carries, whether it sits in a data center, and whether the US side is public or private peering; applicants that only resell name their wholesale providers instead [19]. That duty reaches every international 214 holder, including US-owned ones. Submarine cables, including short ones under the Rio Grande and through a tunnel under the Detroit River, already need cable landing licenses [19].

    Chairman Carr’s statement says these border facilities “are often directly exposed to cartels and other hostile foreign actors looking to gain access to U.S. networks” [19]. For foreign-adversary presence, the order points to news reports of China Unicom’s 30-year Mexican license and Huawei’s growth in Mexico [19]. Verizon’s view, quoted in the order, is that Canada and Mexico are “two close U.S. partners whose security interests regarding cross-border facilities are directly aligned” [19].

    For routing, the order gives the FCC a confidential map of land crossings. It does not filter a route or require anyone to end a peering session, and it leaves out submarine cables such as New Cross Pacific, a US-China system whose landing license names China Telecom, China Unicom and China Mobile [56]. A rule presuming companies controlled by a foreign adversary unfit for an international 214 is still only a proposal [19][20].

    The same kinds of conduct, treated differently

    License actions have not tracked routing behavior.

    Routing incidents with no license consequence. The Internet Society counted 13,935 routing incidents in 2017, 38% of them leaks, hijacks, and other attacks, and wrote that “U.S. and Brazil, followed by Russia and China, lead the list of countries in which networks caused incidents” [12]. Those are raw counts, which track how many networks a country has. In 2019, a BGP optimizer at DQE generated more-specific routes that DQE’s customer Allegheny Technologies passed to Verizon, which announced them to the internet; Cloudflare lost about 15% of its global traffic at worst and wrote, “If Verizon had used RPKI, they would have seen that the advertised routes were not valid” [27]. In April 2020, Rostelecom, Russia’s largest ISP and partly state-owned, announced 8,870 prefixes belonging to almost 200 networks, including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Amazon AWS, for about an hour; Rascom, then Cogent and Level3, carried them onward [28][57]. ICFS shows no application from Rostelecom, so there was no international 214 to revoke [58].

    On February 24, 2008, PCCW Global passed Pakistan Telecom’s hijack of a YouTube prefix to the rest of the internet for two hours and 14 minutes [40]. The FCC’s 2025 show-cause order against HKT and its PCCW Global units cites no routing incident at all. Its routing questions ask which AS numbers the companies use, whether they run BGP, and whom they peer with at US PoPs [35]. The FCC’s own 2021 order concedes the point: “any service provider has the opportunity to engage in traffic path diversions or intentional misrouting,” but “other such providers are not identified like CTA” [1].

    Agreement breaches, settled with payments. In January 2026, the FCC took its first-ever enforcement action on a Team Telecom mitigation agreement against Marlink, a satellite operator that “failed to submit at least 186 foreign employees for DOJ vetting.” Marlink agreed to pay $175,000 [17]. In 2024, CFIUS fined T-Mobile $60 million because it “failed to take appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized access to certain sensitive data” and “failed to report some incidents of unauthorized access promptly to CFIUS” under its national security agreement [18]. China Telecom Americas lost its licenses partly for breaching its agreement. These are not matched cases: neither company is controlled by a foreign adversary, and T-Mobile’s agreement was with CFIUS, not Team Telecom.

    Foreign state ownership, licensed. “Foreign government control of a U.S. carrier in and of itself is not grounds for denial,” the FCC wrote in 2019, citing licenses held by carriers owned by the governments of Indonesia, Aruba and French Polynesia [4].

    Same Chinese law, no license, no action. In PeeringDB, Alibaba lists 1,300G of ports at US exchanges and Tencent 400G, against 30G for ChinaNet [29]. Both are subject to the same Chinese laws. Neither has applied for an international 214 [58], and the 2026 interconnection proposal reaches only Covered List companies unless the FCC widens it to every company it counts as controlled by a foreign adversary, which it asks about [2].

    State-carrier control, no license. China Mobile Hong Kong, which the FCC ordered in December 2025 to fix its robocall filing, took control of HKBN, a Hong Kong broadband provider, in September 2025 and held about 74.84% of it in May 2026 [51][66][67]. HKBN and its enterprise arm list ports at Equinix Los Angeles, Any2West, and Equinix New York [29]. The enterprise arm files in the Robocall Mitigation Database so US carriers can take its voice traffic directly; neither company holds an FCC authorization [58][68]. FCC 26-29’s first proposal would reach listed companies’ current and future affiliates, which, as written, would take in HKBN as part of the China Mobile group [2]. PCCW, which held licenses, drew a show-cause order that cited China Unicom’s 18% stake [35].

    A private owner’s passport. In July 2026, the FCC denied Digitalsystem Technology’s application, and its international services went on the Covered List the same day [30][59]. It has no state owner. The FCC found it subject to Chinese government control through its majority owner, a Chinese citizen who lives in the US. It also cited the company’s Hong Kong partners, its plans for US records and doubts that it would keep a mitigation agreement, and said citizenship alone is not disqualifying [30].

    The Chinese intrusions on record came through other doors. Salt Typhoon, the Chinese campaign inside US telecom networks [3], got in through US carriers’ own network equipment, in most cases with legitimate login credentials [31]. For signaling attacks on US mobile subscribers, mostly while they traveled abroad, a researcher found China the largest source in 2018, with the vast majority of its attacks routed through China Unicom. In 2019, he said, most attacks over 3G networks came from Barbados while China’s volume fell, which he read as likely use of Caribbean proxy networks. China Unicom denied it [32].

    The House select committee’s report says the carriers’ remaining footprint “could have facilitated” Salt Typhoon; its chairman’s October 27 letter to the FCC drops the “could have” [3][54]. The evidence is routing. China Mobile International’s AS58453 appeared in the routing paths to 58 prefixes tied to CISA-confirmed Salt Typhoon servers “at least 192 times” over four days in September 2024, and the committee says the patterns “do not definitively attribute the underlying cyber campaign to the company” [3]. AS58453 is China Mobile’s global network from the second table; the 2019 denial of its US arm’s application did not touch its routing.

    What actually fixes route leaks

    The fix is filtering by the networks that accept the routes.

    Doug Madory, then at Oracle, spent months in 2017 cleaning up a China Telecom detour that sent “US-to-US traffic via mainland China.” It began as “a peer leak” by South Korea’s SK Broadband that China Telecom passed on, with the origin unchanged. When Telia and GTT stopped accepting those routes from China Telecom, the footprint fell by 90%. It “couldn’t prevent them from reaching those who were peering directly with China Telecom” [11]. He declined to address motive.

    Route origin validation would not have caught that one, because the origin was correct. Checks on the AS path are built for leaks like it: peer locking, which dates to 2016, and ASPA, a newer check that is still an IETF draft. Origin validation is older; the IETF standardized it in 2013 [45][46][69]. On APNIC Labs’ 28-day average, networks that drop RPKI-invalid routes served 40.5% of US users when the FCC voted on China Telecom Americas in October 2021, 72.7% at the October 2024 peak, and 53.1% on November 2, 2026 [47]. That measure covers origin validation only.

    RPKI is a fix Qrator called for after Rostelecom’s leak, and Cloudflare said it would have shown Verizon the leaked routes were invalid [28][27]. On September 28, 2026, 47.9% of US routed IPv4 addresses were in RPKI-valid routes, against 65.0% worldwide and 83.0% in China, up from 3.7% a year earlier [33]. Without the Department of Defense, which began announcing most of its space in 2021 to watch for misuse, the US figure would be 62% [33]. By address count, the US holds 59.1% of the world’s routed IPv4 space outside valid routes [33].

    The agencies that recommended the revocations want rules for everyone. DoD and DOJ told the FCC in 2022 that RPKI “can help mitigate this risk,” that requirements to report peering and interconnection partners and to audit routing “may also be necessary and appropriate,” and that, while their actions in license reviews “addressed the specific national security concerns raised in each case,” they “doubt that a license-by-license, case-by-case approach is the most effective way to address the industry-wide issue of BGP vulnerabilities.” Case-by-case activity, they wrote, is “the least desirable way to address systemic risks” [13].

    Same owners, new policy

    China Telecom’s ultimate owner, the Chinese state, never changed; the FCC’s view of it did. The FCC first licensed China Telecom in the US on July 20, 2001, granting the authorization to the state-owned parent itself, China Telecommunications Corporation, which still sat atop CTA’s ownership chain when the license was revoked in 2021 [1]. The FCC called ownership and control the “fundamental concerns in this proceeding” and pointed to “the changed national security environment with respect to China since the Commission authorized CTA” [1].

    PCCW shows the same thing over a longer span. The FCC granted all twelve of PCCW’s international authorizations from 1998 to 2003 [35]. China Netcom, a Chinese state carrier later merged into China Unicom, held a 20% stake in PCCW by mid-2005 [21][60]. The FCC moved 20 years later. Its October 2025 show-cause order rested on ownership. It said “the Commission’s findings in the CUA Order on Revocation indicate that any affiliate of CUA poses a threat,” and treated China Unicom’s roughly 18% stake as a “dominant minority” under a 10% threshold from the FCC’s 2025 submarine cable rules [35]. It counted Hong Kong as part of China, a foreign adversary, citing Commerce’s list and a 2020 executive order ending Hong Kong’s preferential treatment [35]. It added that even without that stake, HKT, “as a company with substantial ownership by PRC interest holders and primary operations in the PRC,” which for HKT means Hong Kong, would still be exposed to exploitation by the Chinese government [35]. It made no finding about PCCW’s own conduct, saying only that HKT’s conduct and representations “may require” a separate review of its character and citing an open staff inquiry into its answers to a 2023 information collection [35]. The trigger was a 2022 finding about China Unicom and 2025 rules.

    The strongest argument against this piece is that something changed on China’s side too. The D.C. Circuit noted that China’s 2017 Cybersecurity Law “requires Chinese companies to cooperate with state agencies on cybersecurity supervision and inspection,” and that a 2018 regulation lets the Ministry of Public Security conduct “on-site and remote inspections” of Chinese telecom companies [14]. Both came after the licenses were granted. That is a fair reason to reassess. But the timing follows Washington more than Beijing. The law is nearly ten years old. The revocations came four to five years after it and the PCCW order eight. DoD and DOJ dated the change themselves: by 2019, they wrote, the national security picture “had changed dramatically,” with cyber issues at the top of that year’s intelligence threat assessment [13]. And the law binds the owner, whatever licenses it holds. It binds Alibaba and Tencent too, whose US networks no license reaches.

    What’s coming

    Voice gets voice tools. In December 2025, the FCC ordered China Telecom Global, China Mobile Hong Kong and China Unicom Hong Kong to fix their Robocall Mitigation Database filings and show why they should not be removed [15][51][52]. Removal would stop US providers from accepting their calls directly when the calls carry a US number in the caller ID field [15]. The FCC’s tentative agenda for its meeting on November 19, 2026, includes “Securing Phone Numbers Against National Security Threats” [34][61]. The public draft covers interconnected VoIP providers with direct access to US phone numbers and would make them certify that they are not on the Covered List and do not use equipment or services from listed producers, or explain, and that they have never been denied a 214 or had one revoked on national security or law enforcement grounds [44]. These fit a telephone concern, and they reach Hong Kong companies that never held a 214 [58].

    FCC 26-29. If adopted as written, the interconnection ban binds telecommunications carriers. Whether it reaches an ISP’s peering session is the open question. NTCA, the rural carriers’ association, told the FCC the proposal “fails to indicate whether any prohibited connections with other entities would extend beyond formal interconnection agreements and include peering, transit arrangements, cloud services, or even connections to content delivery networks” [43].

    What this means for your network

    No FCC action requires you to drop a BGP session with any network named here; whether to keep one is your call. Route leaks, interception, and intrusion can come from any network, so the defenses (AS-path and origin filtering, encryption, locked-down management) apply to all of them. The FCC paperwork that applies to you does not depend on who you peer with. The companion piece, “What Actually Protects Your Network, and What the FCC Actually Requires,” covers the defenses and the filings.

    Cover photo: Owen CL / Wikimedia Commons (via Unsplash), CC0

    Sources

    1. FCC, China Telecom (Americas) Corp., Order on Revocation and Termination, FCC 21-114 (Nov 2, 2021), paras. 2, 7, 8, 71, 72, 82, 83, 86, 92, 100, 116, 142 and 155 and fns. 19 and 391. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-21-114A1_Rcd.pdf
    2. FCC, Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 26-29, WC Docket No. 26-82 (adopted Apr 30, 2026), paras. 6, 10, 14 and 15 and fns. 23, 24 and 28. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-29A1.pdf
    3. House Select Committee on the CCP, “Stranger Pings” (Aug 2026), pp. 3, 6, 14, 16 to 18, 21, 29 and 30; the committee’s report page links the PDF. https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/reports/stranger-pings-chinese-telecom-companies-infiltrate-us-infrastructure and https://files.constantcontact.com/f0eecb46901/f655c442-2d93-45ea-8cab-9d58a3a04052.pdf
    4. FCC, China Mobile International (USA) Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 19-38 (May 2019), paras. 20 and 29 and fn. 64. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-38A1.pdf
    5. FCC, HKT (International) Limited et al., Order and Consent Decree, DA 26-1163 (Oct 30, 2026). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1163A1.txt
    6. FCC, Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet, FCC 24-52, 89 FR 45404 (May 22, 2024), Federal Register doc. 2024-10674. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-05-22/pdf/2024-10674.pdf
    7. Ohio Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, No. 24-7000 (6th Cir. Jan 2, 2025). https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0002p-06.pdf
    8. RIPEstat, AS36678 neighbours, Nov 8, 2026. https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS36678&query_time=2026-11-08T00:00:00
    9. RIPEstat, AS19174 neighbours, Jan 27, 2022 and Nov 8, 2026. https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS19174&query_time=2022-01-27T00:00:00 and https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS19174&query_time=2026-11-08T00:00:00
    10. RIPEstat data API, queried Nov 3 to 10, 2026. Unique neighbor counts (asn-neighbours) for AS23764 (https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS23764&query_time=2021-10-26T00:00:00 and https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS23764&query_time=2026-11-08T00:00:00), AS10099 (https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS10099&query_time=2022-01-27T00:00:00 and https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS10099&query_time=2026-11-08T00:00:00), AS58453 (https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS58453&query_time=2019-05-09T00:00:00 and https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS58453&query_time=2026-11-08T00:00:00) and AS3491 (https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS3491&query_time=2025-10-15T00:00:00 and https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours/data.json?resource=AS3491&query_time=2026-11-08T00:00:00); the same query at the dates in the notes for AS14923 and AS4058, and on Nov 10, 2026 at the same dates for the controls AS2914, AS6453, AS4637, AS3257, AS2516, AS4766, AS7473, AS9304, AS6762 and AS1299; RIS peer counts (ris-peer-count) at the same dates (https://stat.ripe.net/data/ris-peer-count/data.json?starttime=2021-10-26T00:00&endtime=2021-10-26T00:00); asn-neighbours-history for AS4134 (https://stat.ripe.net/data/asn-neighbours-history/data.json?resource=AS4134); and announced-prefixes and rpki-validation for AS36678 (https://stat.ripe.net/data/announced-prefixes/data.json?resource=AS36678&starttime=2021-10-26T00:00:00&endtime=2021-10-27T00:00:00 and the two weeks to Nov 10, 2026, when all five prefixes were RPKI-valid).
    11. Doug Madory, “China Telecom’s Internet Traffic Misdirection,” Oracle Internet Intelligence (Nov 5, 2018), archived copy. https://web.archive.org/web/20190718193106/https://blogs.oracle.com/internetintelligence/china-telecoms-internet-traffic-misdirection
    12. Internet Society, “14,000 Incidents: A 2017 Routing Security Year in Review” (Jan 9, 2018). https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2018/01/14000-incidents-2017-routing-security-year-review/
    13. DoD and DOJ, Comments, PS Docket 22-90 (Sept 14, 2022), pp. 4, 5 and 10. https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/1091496862125/1
    14. China Telecom (Americas) Corp. v. FCC, No. 21-1233 (D.C. Cir. Dec 20, 2022). https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2023/01/21-1233-1981233.pdf
    15. FCC Enforcement Bureau, China Telecom Global Ltd., Order, DA 25-1022 (Dec 8, 2025), para. 11. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-1022A1.txt
    16. FCC, CTExcel consumer guide (Nov 12, 2021). https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/cta_consumer_guide.pdf
    17. FCC, Marlink news release (Jan 8, 2026). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-417571A1.pdf
    18. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Enforcement (2024 penalty, T-Mobile US, Inc.). https://cfius.gov/monitoring-enforcement/enforcement/
    19. FCC, Review of International Section 214 Authorizations, Report and Order and Further Notice, FCC 26-74 (adopted Oct 29, released Nov 5, 2026), paras. 17 to 24, 32, 35, 39, 40, 124 to 126, 159 to 164 and 192, n. 151, and Chairman Carr’s statement (DOC-426302A2). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-74A1.pdf and https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426302A2.pdf
    20. FCC, “FCC Bolsters Security for Cross-Border Communications,” news release (Oct 29, 2026). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426302A1.pdf
    21. PCCW Limited, Form 6-K enclosing circular dated July 8, 2005, appendix on substantial shareholders (China Netcom, 20.00% as of June 28, 2005). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000842519/000095010305001722/jul1205_6k.htm
    22. FCC, Reporting on Border Gateway Protocol Risk Mitigation Progress, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 24-62 (June 7, 2024), paras. 99 to 104. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-62A1.pdf
    23. FCC, Protecting the Nation’s Communications Systems From Cybersecurity Threats, Order on Reconsideration, FCC 25-81 (Nov 21, 2025), para. 23. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-81A1.txt
    24. FCC, Pacific Networks Corp. and ComNet (USA) LLC, Order on Revocation and Termination, FCC 22-22 (Mar 2022), paras. 2 and 80. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-22A1.pdf
    25. Pacific Networks Corp. and ComNet (USA) LLC, Response to Order Instituting Proceeding, GN Docket 20-111 (Apr 2021), pp. 60 to 61. https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/1042975287198/1
    26. PeeringDB, networks named CITIC. https://www.peeringdb.com/api/net?name__contains=CITIC&depth=0
    27. Cloudflare, “How Verizon and a BGP Optimizer Knocked Large Parts of the Internet Offline Today” (June 24, 2019). https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-verizon-and-a-bgp-optimizer-knocked-large-parts-of-the-internet-offline-today/
    28. Qrator Labs, “This is how you deal with route leaks” (Apr 2, 2020). https://blog.qrator.net/en/how-you-deal-route-leaks_69/
    29. PeeringDB, exchange port records (netixlan) for AS45102 (Alibaba), AS132203 (Tencent), AS4134 (ChinaNet), AS9269 (HKBN) and AS9381 (HKBN Enterprise Solutions), port speeds summed for US exchanges (checked Nov 8, 2026). https://www.peeringdb.com/api/netixlan?asn__in=4134,45102,132203,9269,9381
    30. FCC, Digitalsystem Technology Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 26-44 (adopted June 30, released July 7, 2026), paras. 1, 4, 10 and 14. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-44A1.pdf
    31. Cisco Talos, “Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon” (Feb 20, 2025). https://blog.talosintelligence.com/salt-typhoon-analysis/
    32. Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Revealed: China suspected of spying on Americans via Caribbean phone networks,” The Guardian (Dec 15, 2020), reporting Gary Miller’s research. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/15/revealed-china-suspected-of-spying-on-americans-via-caribbean-phone-networks
    33. IPinfo, RPKI by country (data of Sept 28, 2026), and “RPKI Now Protects 70% of Internet Routes, Up From 54% a Year Ago” (Oct 29, 2026). https://ipinfo.io/reports/rpki-country and https://ipinfo.io/blog/rpki-protects-70-internet-routes
    34. FCC, “Carr Proposes Crackdown on Bad Actors’ Access to U.S. Phone Numbers,” news release (Oct 28, 2026). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426264A1.pdf
    35. FCC, HKT (International) Limited et al., Order to Show Cause, DA 25-928 (Oct 15, 2025), paras. 2, 8, 12, 14 and 17, the notes to para. 12 on Hong Kong, fn. 97 and the order’s information requests. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-928A1.pdf
    36. FCC, China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Order on Revocation, FCC 22-9 (adopted Jan 27, 2022, released Feb 2, 2022), paras. 2 and 126. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-9A1.pdf
    37. China Unicom (Americas) Operations Ltd. v. FCC, No. 22-70029 (9th Cir. Dec 24, 2024), majority and dissent. https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/12/24/22-70029.pdf
    38. Pacific Networks Corp. v. FCC, No. 22-1054 (D.C. Cir. Aug 15, 2023), FCC copy. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-396111A1.pdf
    39. China Telecom Americas, product pages for Ethernet Private Lines and IP-VPN (checked Nov 10, 2026). https://www.ctamericas.com/products/data-networking/ethernet-private-lines/ and https://www.ctamericas.com/products/data-networking/ip-vpn/
    40. RIPE NCC, “YouTube Hijacking: A RIPE NCC RIS case study” (Mar 17, 2008). https://www.ripe.net/about-us/news/youtube-hijacking-a-ripe-ncc-ris-case-study/
    41. CTIA, Comments, WC Docket No. 26-82 (June 8, 2026). https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10608157971953/1
    42. VON Coalition, Comments, WC Docket No. 26-82 (June 8, 2026). https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/1060890275097/1
    43. NTCA, Comments, WC Docket No. 26-82 (June 8, 2026). https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/1060873258429/1
    44. FCC, Securing Phone Numbers Against National Security Threats, Fourth Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice, public draft, WC Docket Nos. 13-97, 07-243 and 20-67, DOC-426316 (Oct 29, 2026), paras. 3 and 25 and fact sheet. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426316A1.pdf
    45. IETF, RFC 6811, “BGP Prefix Origin Validation” (Jan 2013). https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6811
    46. Tyler McDaniel, Jared M. Smith and Max Schuchard, “Flexsealing BGP Against Route Leaks: Peerlock Active Measurement and Analysis,” arXiv:2006.06576 (2020), abstract and Section III.A. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.06576
    47. APNIC Labs, Use of RPKI Validation for United States of America (US), I-RoV filtering series, 28-day window: 40.5% on Oct 26, 2021, the series’ peak of 72.7% on Oct 5, 2024 and 53.1% on Nov 2, 2026, read by UTC date from the data file on Nov 10, 2026. https://stats.labs.apnic.net/rpki/US and https://stats.labs.apnic.net/cgi-bin/rpki-json-table.pl?x=US
    48. FCC, “Carr Announces Sweeping New Investigation into CCP-Aligned Entities,” news release (Mar 21, 2025). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-410318A1.pdf
    49. China Telecom (Americas) Corporation, Comments, WC Docket No. 26-82 (June 8, 2026), Summary and background. https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10608082534596/1
    50. FCC, EDOCS search for PS Docket No. 24-146, listing only FCC 24-62 (June 7, 2024) and DA 24-939, “Limited Modification to Ex Parte Rules in BGP Proceeding” (Sept 12, 2024) (checked Nov 10, 2026). https://www.fcc.gov/edocs/search-results?t=advanced&dockets=24-146 and https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-939A1.txt
    51. FCC Enforcement Bureau, China Mobile Hong Kong Company Ltd., Order, DA 25-1020 (Dec 8, 2025). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-1020A1.txt
    52. FCC Enforcement Bureau, China Unicom (Hong Kong) Operations Ltd., Order, DA 25-1021 (Dec 8, 2025). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-1021A1.txt
    53. China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Comments, WC Docket No. 26-82 (June 8, 2026), section V.A, p. 9. https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/1060859276512/1
    54. Rep. John Moolenaar, Chairman, House Select Committee on the CCP, letter to FCC Chairman Brendan Carr, WC Docket No. 26-82 (Oct 27, 2026). https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/26110083778/1
    55. ARIN, RDAP record for AS14923, registered to Graham Technology Solutions LLC on Apr 1, 2024 (checked Nov 10, 2026). https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/14923
    56. FCC International Bureau, Actions Taken Under Cable Landing License Act, Public Notice, DA 17-55 (Jan 13, 2017), New Cross Pacific cable system, File No. SCL-LIC-20151104-00029. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-17-55A1.pdf
    57. Interfax, “Rostec asks for govt stake in Rostelecom ‘to concentrate resources’ amid sanctions” (Apr 14, 2022), on the state’s 35.91% stake. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/78242/
    58. FCC, International Communications Filing System (ICFS), public searches for “Rostelecom,” “Alibaba,” “Tencent,” “China Telecom,” “China Mobile,” “China Unicom,” “HKBN” and “Hong Kong Broadband” (Nov 8, 2026). Rostelecom, Tencent and HKBN Enterprise Solutions have registration numbers and no applications; Alibaba and “Hong Kong Broadband” have no records; China Telecom Global, China Mobile Hong Kong and China Unicom’s Hong Kong companies have no international 214 applications. https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/icfs?id=ibfs_search
    59. FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, “FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Certain Services of Digitalsystem Technology Inc. to FCC Covered List,” Public Notice, DA 26-673 (July 7, 2026). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-673A1.pdf
    60. Xinhua, “China Netcom, China Unicom Merger Completed, Biggest In Country’s History” (Oct 15, 2008), as republished by China Digital Times. https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/10/china-netcom-china-unicom-merger-completed-biggest-in-countrys-history/
    61. FCC, “November 2026 Open Commission Meeting,” event page listing “Securing Phone Numbers Against National Security Threats” on the tentative agenda for Nov 19, 2026 (checked Nov 10, 2026). https://www.fcc.gov/November2026
    62. Todd Shields, “China Telecom Vows to Defy FCC Eviction, Keep Operating in U.S.,” Bloomberg (Dec 22, 2021), quoting the company’s Dec 20, 2021 letter to the FCC, via Yahoo Finance. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-telecom-vows-keep-operating-190547502.html
    63. FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel, letter to Andrew D. Lipman, counsel for China Telecom (Americas) Corp., GN Docket No. 20-109, DOC-378910A1 (Dec 30, 2021). https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-378910A1.pdf
    64. Internet Archive, Wayback Machine captures of China Telecom Americas’ product pages: IP-VPN and private leased circuits (May 30 and 31, 2023), Ethernet private lines (Mar 29, 2023), and the redesigned IP-VPN and Ethernet private lines pages (June 26, 2023). https://web.archive.org/web/20230530233415/https://www.ctamericas.com/products-services/data-networking/ip-vpn/ and https://web.archive.org/web/20230626021348/https://www.ctamericas.com/products/data-networking/ip-vpn/
    65. FCC Enforcement Bureau, China Mobile International (USA) Inc., Citation and Order, DA 25-512 (June 16, 2025), paras. 2, 5 and 9 and fn. 5. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-512A1.pdf
    66. China Mobile Hong Kong Company Limited, announcement that its offer for HKBN Ltd. became unconditional, HKEX (Sept 3, 2025). https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2025/0903/2025090301878.pdf
    67. HKBN Ltd., “Change of Financial Year End Date,” announcement (May 21, 2026), naming China Mobile Hong Kong as its controlling shareholder with about 74.84%, copy hosted by AASTOCKS. https://iis.aastocks.com/20260521/12166726-0.PDF
    68. FCC, Robocall Mitigation Database, full listing, entry RMD0006806 for HKBN Enterprise Solutions Limited as a foreign voice service provider, recertified Feb 26, 2026 (checked Nov 8, 2026). https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/rmd?id=rmd_listings
    69. IETF, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification, “BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects,” version 29 (Oct 16, 2026), IESG state as of Nov 2026. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification/
    70. FAR 52.204-25, “Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment” (Nov 2021), paragraphs (a) and (b)(2). https://www.acquisition.gov/far/52.204-25