Mike Hammett has spent more than 20 years building and operating ISP, voice, internet exchange, and colocation networks.
This article is part of a series on government network outages. The other pieces will be published as they are completed.
TL;DR
- By my count, at least 29 network failures since 2009 have taken down 911 or local alerting, 25 of them with a detailed published cause. Four of those 25 began with an error during maintenance or a network change, which can break any network, though in two of them a design gap let the error spread. In each of the other 21, one failure alone took service down, or two failures shared a cause, or a second failure came before the first was repaired.
- They include a Colorado routing facility that stopped sending calls to 81 call centers in seven states [1], four supposedly diverse paths that met in one Houston facility, a “temporary” repair left in place for 11 years [2], and one AT&T switch that 73 of Oklahoma’s 122 call centers were connected to [3][4].
- In June 2026, the FCC voted to replace the annual 911 diversity certification with a one-time filing [5]. After proposing to require that providers eliminate single points of failure, it adopted “reasonably sufficient mitigation” of them instead [5].
- State 911 authorities can contract for what the federal rule does not require. California’s new plan keeps a statewide backup provider behind its primary one [6], and Nebraska’s new solicitation demands no single point of failure [7].
911 Is a Government Service on Someone Else’s Network
911 is a government service that runs mostly on networks the government does not own. State and local 911 authorities contract with carriers and vendors for routing, transport, and call delivery, and commercial carriers carry most calls to the call centers [8]. When those networks fail, the public cannot reach help. A carrier answers to its customers. A 911 authority answers to everyone who will ever need to call, so its contracts have to demand more than a carrier would build on its own.
The Standard on Paper
The FCC adopted its 911 reliability rule in December 2013, after the June 2012 derecho, which its public safety bureau found had disrupted 911 mostly through preventable failures, among them critical circuits that lacked physical diversity [9]. Under that rule, covered carriers certified, under penalty of perjury, that they had audited critical 911 circuits for physical diversity and tagged them so later rearrangements would not quietly collapse that diversity [9][10]. A carrier that could not certify an element could instead show alternative measures “reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure” [10]. The rule states the physical standard plainly: “Circuits or paths that share a common segment such as a fiber-optic cable or circuit board are not physically diverse even if they are logically diverse for purposes of transmitting data” [10].
For legacy circuits, the covered path runs from the selective router to the central office that serves each call center, and the FCC’s guidance says the diversity audits apply to the facilities between those two points [10][11]. The same guidance says the “local loop” between each call center and its serving central office is not subject to the audits [11]. That last segment is where one cable or one building entrance can undo everything upstream. In 2009, the FCC’s public safety bureau had written that “in the ideal situation, diversity should be gained by connection to separate central offices,” and that separate entrance facilities at the call center were also desirable [12].
In June 2026, the FCC voted to replace the annual certification with a one-time certification, updated only after material changes [5]. Providers that filed annual certifications under the 2013 rule file none during the transition, and the first one-time certification is due 18 months after the FCC’s public safety bureau announces that the Office of Management and Budget has approved the new filing requirements [5]. It had proposed requiring providers to “eliminate all single points of failure rather than mitigate them,” and adopted a benchmark of “reasonably sufficient mitigation of single points of failure” instead [5]. For IP paths, the rule now lets a provider meet the physical diversity benchmark “by implementing automatic rerouting capabilities, load balancing, and geographically-distributed routing facilities, transport nodes, and node links sufficient to reasonably mitigate the risks of single points of failure,” and it counts VPN service over the public internet among the “automatically re-routed paths” [10]. The same order brings major IP transport and IP 911 aggregation providers under the rules for the first time, and it lets a statewide, territorial, or tribal 911 authority request a provider’s certifications and reports directly, under a confidentiality agreement [5].
The 911 Record
On April 9, 2014, a 911 routing facility run by Intrado in Englewood, Colorado, stopped sending calls to 81 call centers in seven states [1]. A software counter that assigned an identifier to each call stopped counting at 40 million [13]. The routing system logged the failure as low level, a default setting Intrado had accepted, and raised no major or critical alarm [1]. More than 11 million people lost 911 service for up to six hours, until Intrado switched the traffic to its Miami hub, which restored service almost at once [1]. The FCC fined CenturyLink $16 million and Intrado $1.4 million [14], and its report flagged the trend of carriers and call centers contracting 911 functions out to third parties [1].
On December 27, 2018, a switching module in a CenturyLink optical node in Denver generated four malformed management packets [15]. They traveled over a proprietary management channel that the equipment’s maker, Infinera, ships enabled by default and that CenturyLink knew about but neither configured nor used, and the nodes kept retransmitting them to one another [15]. The outage lasted almost 37 hours and affected as many as 22 million customers in 39 states, including about 17 million in 29 states who lacked reliable access to 911 [15]. The FCC found that “at least 886 calls to 911 were not delivered” [15]. Washington’s utility commission says the outage left residents there without 911 for almost 50 hours [16].
On June 15, 2020, a fiber transport link in T-Mobile’s network failed for about 12 minutes, and the outage that followed lasted more than 12 hours [17]. T-Mobile had misconfigured the weight of the links to one of its routers, so traffic from the failed link went to a router that “was not provisioned to process the signaling traffic that the failed link carried,” and a software flaw had been latent for months [17]. The outage kept 23,621 of the 134,874 calls to 911 that reached T-Mobile’s network from reaching call centers [17].
On July 11, 2025, Pennsylvania’s statewide NG911 system had intermittent outages, and the state warned the public by Wireless Emergency Alert [18]. A preliminary report traced them to an operating system defect in a core that runs four instances in two data centers [19].
Local governments depend on the same commercial networks. During the August 8, 2023, Lahaina wildfire, all 21 cell towers serving West Maui experienced what Maui County calls “total cell service failure” while the county sent at least 14 Wireless Emergency Alert messages telling residents to evacuate [20]. The county says it did not know about the failures during its response. In 2024, it sued the wireless carriers, alleging they did not give its 911 operators the outage notice federal rules require within 30 minutes [20]. The FCC reported some 911 calls were not going through because the Lahaina switch was isolated [21]. Fiber strung on power poles burned, while underground fiber through Lahaina survived [22]. Its owner, Sandwich Isles Communications, had buried it in 2009, and its founder, Albert Hee, offered the surviving strands to the carriers [22].
Nashville 2020: One Building, 66 Districts
On Christmas morning 2020, a bomb in an RV exploded outside AT&T’s central office at 185 Second Avenue North in Nashville. The blast knocked out the building’s primary power, and flooding took out its emergency backup generators [23].
The 911 damage was wider and longer. Sixty-six Tennessee emergency communications districts had service interruptions lasting more than 97 hours [24]. Some 911 centers did not get AT&T’s outage notices for six days, in some cases because the link that carried them had been damaged [25]. Nashville’s own emergency communications center kept outbound calling by using older phones from a different carrier, pre-positioned at each console, and APCO’s account of the event concluded that carrier diversity is “an absolute must” [26]. One building held the switching and the power for a region, and the path that told 911 centers what was happening broke along with them.
Failures Far From Home
Aggregation puts many services behind one point, and the outage lands wherever the services are, regardless of where the failure is. In December 2016, a fire at a Sprint building in Omaha left Sprint customers in the Twin Cities unable to reach 911 [27][28]. On August 1, 2018, Minnesota’s statewide 911 failed for about an hour after a maintenance error by a technician at its vendor, West, disrupted the vendor’s Miami hub [29]. On January 12, 2021, a bad card supporting a large national fiber in Green Bay, Wisconsin, left dispatchers in eight southeastern Minnesota counties unable to hear 911 callers for 7 hours and 12 minutes [30]. In April 2024, a fiber cut in Kansas City took 911 down across South Dakota and in parts of Nebraska and Nevada [31].
In January 2026, a cable cut left the 911 center in Park County, Wyoming, with a single cell phone as the public’s only way to reach it for about three hours, and service was not fully restored for days [32][33]. Monte McClain, Park County’s communications supervisor and 911 manager, said the state’s 911 calls all route through one selective router in Cheyenne, and if the line between the county and Cheyenne is cut, “we go dead” [32]. On September 23, 2026, a switch AT&T uses to route 911 calls in Oklahoma failed. The state’s 911 coordinator said 73 of its 122 call centers were connected to that switch, and for about seven hours their calls went to the wrong centers or to backup ten-digit numbers [3][4].
The FCC’s 2014 report on the Colorado failure warned that “a 911 outage in an IP-supported network has the potential to affect a much greater number of PSAPs and people, across multiple states” [1]. The Nebraska commission told its State 911 Department that reaching five nines may require eliminating aggregation points [2]. Aggregation is cheaper, with fewer routing centers, fewer circuits, and one contract, and each consolidation widens the area one failure reaches.
Before California’s next-generation design went in, a network examination for the state’s Public Utilities Commission found that only 41 of the 93 call centers hosted at Frontier central offices had confirmed diverse connections [34]. Cal OES split the state into four regions, each served by its own regional network provider, and added a prime provider to give every call center a second level of service over “separate unique paths to each PSAP” [35]. The national 911 program called the design “highly effective for ensuring physical and logical diversity is provided from call inception to termination” [35]. Between 2021 and 2024, only 23 of the state’s roughly 450 dispatch centers began moving voice calls onto the regional networks, and some “reported routing problems, outages, and dropped calls” [6]. The state’s Legislative Analyst’s Office reports that “complexities of the network and interdependencies between the service providers created failure points” [6]. In November 2025, Cal OES switched to a plan with one primary statewide provider and one backup provider, and it now expects to retire legacy 911 in 2030 [6]. The failures in this section come from aggregation onto one provider and one set of paths. California’s came from providers that depended on each other. A properly designed network keeps the reach of a single failure no larger than the place where it happened. That means regional routing that can stand alone, local fallback when the national core is unreachable, and paths that leave each region by different routes.
Nebraska’s Audit Stopped at the Incumbent’s Plant
Nebraska’s Public Service Commission investigated three Lumen 911 outages and issued its findings in January 2025 [2]. On August 31, 2023, two separate fiber cuts, one in Minnesota and one in Omaha, left Nebraskans unable to reach 911 for over 10 hours [2]. The Minnesota cut came first and stayed unrepaired until 5:31 a.m. on September 1 [2]. The commission found “the lack of diversity and redundancy was the root cause of this failure” [2]. On April 17, 2024, a single cut in Kansas City “revealed a single point of failure” tied to “a repair that was put in place about a decade ago which was supposed to be temporary” [2]. The ring had been collapsed for 11 years, and Lumen had “not completed a full physical fiber audit in at least 11 years” [2]. On July 9, 2024, four paths that were supposed to be diverse “all four met in the same facility in Houston,” and a power loss there cut off 14 Nebraska call centers [2]. It also found that Lumen’s 911 system “at best performed at three nines and not the five nines guaranteed by Lumen” [2]. A guarantee the buyer cannot check protects the invoice and little else.
There is usually far more fiber, and more diverse fiber, than a carrier’s diversity audit admits. A real audit looks past the incumbent’s own plant to the local cable company, the local telephone company, highway department fiber, regional and national fiber networks, local ISPs, and the electric utility. It also counts the middle-mile transport that networks run through other networks’ territory on the way between towns they serve. Near where I live in northern Illinois, Comcast fiber crosses a town Mediacom serves on its way from one Comcast town to another. Nebraska law requires its next-generation 911 contractor to report each year on “the capabilities and redundancies of the next-generation 911 service network” [36]. The 2024 diversity audit filed under that law, while Lumen held the contract, lists 13 call centers that were not fully diverse, and the reasons and alternative measures it gives concern the provider’s own cables, cross-connects, common equipment, and routes to the incumbent carrier [37][38].
The Nebraska Public Power District had installed 1,115 miles of fiber by 2011, in and around South Sioux City, Norfolk, Lincoln, North Platte, Grand Island, Kearney, and other towns, and the Public Service Commission has approved the prices at which it leases dark fiber to carriers [39]. The Omaha Public Power District maintains 621 miles of optical ground wire on its power lines and owns 200 miles of underground fiber [40]. The state Department of Transportation lists 144-strand fiber along I-80, N-370, N-50, and US-75 in Sarpy County and the Omaha metro [41], and Sarpy County is home to Offutt Air Force Base, whose call center is one of the 13 in the audit [37].
Hamilton Telecommunications, the local exchange carrier in Hamilton County, completed its first fiber SONET ring in 1985 and, in 2010, joined six other local telecommunications companies to form NebraskaLink [42], which won a federal grant toward a middle-mile network of nearly 2,000 miles across nearly the entire state [43].
In cloud engineers’ shorthand, pets are unique systems kept alive by hand, and cattle are interchangeable units in arrays built for failure [44]. Many incumbent telephone companies treat their infrastructure as pets instead of cattle. They build everything in a town around one poorly maintained building in the middle of the wire center and the plant around it, and when diversity comes up, that building is the only facility they think of. A second route does not have to end there, and no one company has to own all of it. Fiber from the electric utility, the highway department, a regional network, and a local ISP can be chained into a path that lands at a different central office, a different data center, or the other node of the 911 core. Next-generation 911 has moved from switched-access voice to IP packets, and packets can reach the core over any provider’s path. The FCC’s June 2026 order anticipates that providers may use “general Internet paths as diverse pathways” for 911 traffic [5].
Nebraska’s audit covers the path from the IP core to each call center, and the reasons it gives for missing diversity include channel banks, digital cross-connect systems, and SONET, all gear from the circuit-switched telephone network [37]. Eight of the 13 entries cite central office avoidance as a reason the circuits are not fully diverse, and six say full diversity was economically infeasible [37]. For the Hamilton County Sheriff, the entry reads “Only one fiber route to ILEC” and says a second would take more than 15 miles of new fiber and the incumbent’s agreement [37]. Pierce County’s entry describes the same kind of build, and no entry proposes a route over another owner’s fiber or to a different building or node [37]. Those two entries and six others list “Circuits are logically diverse” as an alternative measure, which the federal rule does not count as physical diversity [10][37]. The audit also asks the provider to list every call center with physically diverse circuits. The only entry is “Whitefish County Flathead Backup,” and the audit does not say where that is [37]. Whitefish is in Flathead County, Montana, where the county’s 911 center had a backup system in 2017 [45]. Every location’s cost is different, but a second path rarely means building a new network from scratch. The expensive pieces are likely already there, just owned by somebody else.
In July 2026, Nebraska posted its intent to award the statewide next-generation 911 network and core services contract to AT&T, over four other bidders, including Lumen [46][47]. The solicitation requires the network to “ensure no single point of failure through diverse network paths for the entire system” [7]. Lumen’s bid to keep the contract said that where it could not provide a diverse path to a call center, it recommended “a common access provider to diverse network POP locations” and “a tertiary over-the-air solution,” such as low Earth orbit satellite or 5G/LTE [48]. With a common access provider, both circuits can still share one trench into the building, however many POPs they reach.
The solicitation also requires core data centers “separated by at least 100 miles,” network diagrams that show “physical and logical path diversity,” out-of-band management and monitoring traffic, failover testing before a change is accepted, and proactive tracing of IP routing within the diverse and redundant paths [7]. Bidders had to submit a diversity plan covering route and provider diversity, facility and region separation, and power, and show how a fault in a provider’s network for another state would be kept out of Nebraska’s [7]. The winner must also identify the places with limited physical diversity or single-threaded resources and propose a mitigation for each [7]. Its maintenance procedures must not create single points of failure during changes [7]. That is the standard the FCC declined to adopt, written into a solicitation by a state that lived through the failures. It holds only if the state checks the diversity plan against route records down to the fiber, because the physical layer is where Nebraska’s own audit found its gaps.
The Same Chains of Contractors
911 networks run through chains of contractors, and each link sees only its own piece. In December 2018, TeleCommunication Systems, which provided next-generation 911 service in Washington and north central Texas, stopped receiving 911 calls from those areas for stretches because its signaling links ran over CenturyLink’s network, and its signaling provider said it could not provide any alternate routing [15]. The FCC’s new order lets a provider that relies on third-party facilities certify to “network practices within their control” and cite the representations third parties make in service level agreements [5]. Building a route from several companies is sound practice, but a rule that lets each company vouch only for its own piece leaves no one certifying the segments they share.
The FCC’s Case for Mitigation
The FCC’s case is that IP networks are built differently. Providers told it that eliminating all single points of failure would be cost prohibitive or infeasible. Next-generation 911 networks route calls dynamically, they said, so packets can converge at single points without the provider knowing. The FCC agreed that “eliminating all single points of failure is not presently a design goal of typical NG911 deployments” [5]. It called auditing and tagging legacy TDM practices that “do not necessarily measure the inherently more-resilient geodiversity of IP networks” [5]. It also left the choice to states. A state 911 authority, it wrote, may decide that “paying for diverse IP transmission paths to remote or rural PSAPs is cost prohibitive” and use policy routing to send calls to other call centers when one goes offline [5]. It ended the annual certification, concluding that “annual filing is not an effective means of obtaining timely and actionable information” and that it burdens providers whose networks have not changed [5]. Under the new rule, providers file an update within 90 days of finding a material change, and they judge for themselves what counts as material [5]. For legacy circuits, the rule still names yearly diversity audits as the way to meet the standard, but providers no longer certify them each year [5][10].
That measures the rule against how NG911 networks are built today, and the record above shows what that design produces. The FCC’s own release announcing the June 2026 order said it had seen “a corresponding increase in major, multi-state 911 service outages” as the nation moved to NG911 over the past decade [49]. The need for diversity does not go away when 911 moves from TDM to IP. Packets still ride fiber, and two IP paths that share a trench, a conduit, or a building entrance fail together, as two TDM circuits would.
Geodiversity in the core does nothing for a call center with one fiber route to the incumbent’s office. Rerouting calls to a neighbor is a real tool, and it works only when the neighbor’s paths do not run through the same failure. In January 2026, the cable cut that isolated Park County’s 911 center in Wyoming also disrupted 911 calls in neighboring Big Horn County, and both counties’ calls were eventually sent to dispatchers in Worland [33].
The point of an annual audit is to find a gap before it takes 911 down, and that is worth the burden. A filing updated only when a provider finds a change leaves the finding to the next outage. Lumen’s Kansas City gap was found by a fiber cut, after at least 11 years without a full physical fiber audit [2]. The failures under the old rule mean the FCC needs to get tougher with providers, not weaker.
What Would Change the Record
The first change is the standard the FCC proposed and then dropped. Providers should have to eliminate single points of failure on 911 paths, audit them every year under an accountable official’s certification, and carry the audit past the serving central office to the call center’s own building entrance.
The second is enforcement. The federal rule requiring carriers to notify potentially affected 911 call centers of outages within 30 minutes [50] exists for counties like Maui, which says it sent evacuation alerts to towers it did not know were down [20]. The FCC should enforce it against every carrier that leaves a county sending alerts to dead towers.
The third is disclosure. Carriers already report outages to the FCC on a 72-hour and 30-day clock [50]. Every 911 outage that blocks calls should end with a published reason for outage on the same clock. Nebraska’s solicitation requires a root cause analysis for any system trouble, but it lets the contractor mark those analyses, and its detailed network maps, as confidential [7]. The Nebraska commission’s order shows what a published report can look like. It named the 11-year temporary repair, the collapsed ring, and the four paths that met in Houston [2].
The fourth is the contract, which state 911 authorities control now. Every 911 contract can require diverse paths into each call center, separate power behind them, monitoring of the backup path, and out-of-band management of the provider’s critical network elements. It can also require failure domains that keep one region’s failure out of the others and are tested on a schedule with results reported to the state, and repair times on the redundant half, with remedies beyond credits.
The diversity audit has to count every owner’s fiber, end the second path at a different central office, data center, or core node, and map any chained route to the trench again after every change. A state without its own network engineer needs one, on staff or independent of every bidder, to write the requirements, read the route maps, and witness the tests. It can also use its new right to ask providers for their reliability information.
The last is a third path. For the largest call centers and the sites that run the 911 core, two wireline paths are not enough. A third path that is not wireline at all, such as licensed microwave or satellite, cannot share a trench, a conduit, or a central office with the other two. It only has to carry 911 calls and their location data, but it has to be independent in every other way, with its own building entrance, power, carrier, and management. Lumen’s own Nebraska bid recommended an over-the-air third path where it could not provide a diverse one [48], and Indiana’s 911 board “has implemented tertiary connections from third party service providers” where legacy circuits proved unreliable [51]. The test for the third path is whether it fails for reasons the other two do not share. A cellular path can ride the same fiber and lose power in the same storm as the wireline paths it is meant to back up. In West Maui, burned overhead fiber took out 911 and cell service together [22]. Using one satellite network for every call center’s third path passes that test, because an outage of that network leaves the two wireline paths up. Starlink’s cheapest business plan, for example, costs $55 a month plus equipment [52][53].
Quick Compare: 911 Outages
The table counts network failures since 2009 that this article found documented and that took down 911 or local alerting, even briefly. It is not a complete list. Four rows are marked Unknown because this article found no published account that shows what was single, and they stay in the count. The pattern claim in the TL;DR covers the other 25, except the four that began with an error during maintenance or a network change. The last column is this article’s reading of each cited cause.
| Date | Service | Reported cause | What was single |
|---|---|---|---|
| April 9, 2009 | 911 in Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and San Benito counties | Fiber cut in manholes by unknown attackers [54][55] | Unprotected fiber route |
| October 29 and 30, 2012 | New York area 911 | Sandy flooded central offices and their backup power [56] | Backup power in a flood zone |
| April 16, 2013 | Some 911 systems south of San Jose | Fiber cut in a vault before the substation attack [57][58][59] | Unprotected vault |
| April 9 and 10, 2014 | 81 call centers in seven states | Routing counter hit its limit; alarms rated low-level [1][13] | One routing center |
| December 13, 2016 | Sprint 911 in Omaha and the Twin Cities | Electrical fire at Sprint’s Omaha exchange [27][28] | One building |
| March 8, 2017 | AT&T wireless 911, about 12,600 callers | Network change pushed a bad whitelist record to the live 911 network [60] | Change error; one logical path for two vendors |
| August 1, 2018 | Minnesota statewide 911 | Maintenance error at the Miami hub [29] | Maintenance error; backup hub partly failed |
| December 27 to 29, 2018 | 911 in 29 states | Malformed packets on an unused management channel enabled by default [15] | One transport network |
| June 15, 2020 | T-Mobile 911 nationwide | Traffic failed over to a router not provisioned for it [17] | Backup on paper |
| September 28, 2020 | 911 in ten states | Intrado traffic manager work; Lumen failed with it [61] | Change error, propagated |
| December 25, 2020 | 911 in 66 Tennessee districts | Bombing cut central office power; flooding took the generators [23][24] | One central office |
| January 12, 2021 | Eight southeastern Minnesota counties | Bad card on national fiber in Green Bay [30] | Remote aggregation point |
| August 8 and 9, 2023 | West Maui 911 and county alerts | Fire burned overhead fiber; all 21 towers failed [20][21][22] | Overhead fiber route |
| August 31 to September 1, 2023 | Nebraska 911, 41 call centers | Two fiber cuts, the first unrepaired [2] | Unrepaired first failure |
| September 2 and 3, 2023 | Four Nebraska counties | Fire at Windstream’s Lincoln facility [62][63] | One facility |
| December 12, 2023 | Six Indiana counties and the Indianapolis airport | Disruption to servers hosted by AT&T, per the state [64] | One provider’s host servers |
| February 22, 2024 | AT&T wireless, more than 25,000 calls to 911 | Misconfigured network element put into production [65] | Maintenance error |
| April 17, 2024 | Nebraska, South Dakota, Nevada | Fiber cut on an 11-year temporary repair [2][31] | Collapsed ring |
| May 30, 2024 | Landline 911 in parts of Iowa | Pipe break forced a power-down in a Lumen building [66][67] | One building’s power |
| June 18, 2024 | Massachusetts statewide 911 | Vendor firewall blocked calls [68] | One network element |
| July 9, 2024 | Nebraska 911, 14 call centers | Power loss in Houston [2] | Four paths, one facility |
| May 29, 2025 | Five southeast Nebraska counties | Fiber cut on Lumen’s network [69] | Unknown |
| July 11, 2025 | Pennsylvania statewide NG911 | Operating system defect in the 911 core [18][19] | One software defect |
| September 25, 2025 | Parts of Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama | Third-party fiber cuts in AT&T’s network [70] | Unknown |
| January 5 to 9, 2026 | Park and Big Horn counties, Wyoming | Fiber cut on the path to the state’s one selective router [32][33] | One path, one router |
| January 14, 2026 | Verizon wireless nationwide, including some calls to 911 | Software issue, per Verizon [71][72][73] | Unknown |
| June 15, 2026 | Parts of four states | Cause not published [74][75] | Unknown |
| August 6, 2026 | Dakota County 911 | 511 Building outage, likely a power failure; backup power also affected [76][77] | One building |
| September 23, 2026 | Oklahoma 911, 73 of 122 call centers | One AT&T routing switch failed [3][4] | One switch |
Cover photo: USDAgov, U.S. Department of Agriculture / Wikimedia Commons, public domain
Sources
[1] FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, April 2014 Multistate 911 Outage: Cause and Impact, Report and Recommendations, PS Docket No. 14-72, October 2014. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-330012A1.pdf
[2] Nebraska Public Service Commission, Order Issuing Findings and Closing Investigation, Application Nos. 911-075/PI-248 and 911-077/C-5581/PI-252, January 14, 2025. https://nebraska.gov/psc/orders/state911/2025-01-14%20911-075%20PI-248%20911-077%20C-5581%20PI-252%20Order%20Issuing%20Findings%20and%20Closing%20Investigation.pdf
[3] Lauren Henry, KFOR, via Yahoo News, “Disruption at 911 call centers caused by switch failure,” September 24, 2026. https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/disruption-911-call-centers-caused-230502600.html
[4] Olivia Hickey, KOCO, “911 outage disrupts emergency calls across Oklahoma for hours,” September 24, 2026. https://www.koco.com/article/911-outage-disrupts-emergency-calls-across-oklahoma/73876198
[5] FCC, Facilitating Implementation of Next Generation 911 Services (NG911); Improving 911 Reliability, Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 26-39, adopted June 25, 2026, released June 26, 2026. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-39A1.pdf
[6] Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The 2026-27 Budget: Office of Emergency Services Next Generation 911 System,” February 27, 2026. https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/5145
[7] Nebraska Public Service Commission, Request for Proposal 202691101, Emergency Services IP Network (ESInet) and Next Generation Core Services, February 10, 2026. https://das.nebraska.gov/materiel/purchasing/RFP%20202691101/2026-2-10%20911%20RFP%20FINAL.pdf
[8] FCC, Sixteenth Annual Report to Congress on State Collection and Distribution of 911 and Enhanced 911 Fees and Charges, for calendar year 2023, December 30, 2024. https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/16th-Annual-911FeeReport-2024.pdf
[9] FCC, Improving 911 Reliability, Report and Order, FCC 13-158, December 2013. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-13-158A1_Rcd.pdf
[10] 47 CFR § 9.19 (Legal Information Institute). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/47/9.19
[11] FCC, Frequently Asked Questions: FCC 911 Reliability Certification, updated February 16, 2024. https://www.fcc.gov/frequently-asked-questions-fcc-911-reliability-certification
[12] FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Tech Topic #14, route diversity for PSAPs (archived May 8, 2009). https://web.archive.org/web/20090508103035/http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/techtopics/techtopics14.html
[13] Robert N. Charette, IEEE Spectrum, “FCC Chairman Calls April’s Seven State Sunny Day 911 Outage ‘Terrifying’,” October 27, 2014. https://spectrum.ieee.org/-fcc-chairman-calls-aprils-seven-state-sunny-day-911-outage-terrifying-
[14] FCC, “FCC Fines CenturyLink and Intrado $17.4 Million for Multi-State 911 Outage,” April 6, 2015. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-332853A1.pdf
[15] FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, December 27, 2018 CenturyLink Network Outage Report, August 19, 2019. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-359134A1.pdf
[16] Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, “CenturyLink faces $7.2 million penalty for 2018 911 outage,” Docket UT-181051, 2020. https://utc.wa.gov/news/2020/centurylink-faces-72-million-penalty-2018-911-outage
[17] FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, June 15, 2020 T-Mobile Network Outage Report, PS Docket No. 20-183, October 22, 2020. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-367699A1.pdf
[18] Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, “Shapiro Administration Announces Statewide 911 Outage Has Been Resolved,” July 2025. https://www.pa.gov/agencies/pema/newsroom/2025/shapiro-administration-announces-statewide-911-outage-has-been-r
[19] Central Bucks News, “9-1-1 outage caused by operating system ‘defect,’ not cyberattack,” July 24, 2025. https://centralbucksnews.com/news/2025/jul/24/9-1-1-outage-caused-by-operating-system-defect-not-cyberattack
[20] Peter Boylan, Honolulu Star-Advertiser, via Hawaii Tribune-Herald, “Maui County sues cell carriers for noncompliance amid fires,” May 3, 2024. https://hawaiitribune-herald.com/?p=320924
[21] RCR Wireless, “FCC: 95% of cell sites out in areas affected by Maui’s wildfires,” August 14, 2023. https://www.rcrwireless.com/20230814/featured/fcc-95-of-cell-sites-out-in-areas-affected-by-mauis-wildfires
[22] Kevin Dayton, Honolulu Civil Beat, “Fragile Fiber Lines In Lahaina Were Burned And Battered, Taking Out 911 And Cell Service. Now What?” August 18, 2023. https://civilbeat.org/2023/08/fragile-fiber-lines-in-lahaina-were-burned-and-battered-taking-out-911-and-cell-service-now-what/
[23] Rich Miller, Data Center Frontier, “Nashville Explosion: AT&T Repairs Damage to its Building and Network,” December 28, 2020. https://www.datacenterfrontier.com/featured/article/11428484/nashville-explosion-at038t-repairs-damage-to-its-building-and-network
[24] Tennessee Lookout, “Tennessee board details impact of Christmas bombing on 911 systems,” May 19, 2021. https://tennesseelookout.com/2021/05/19/tennessee-board-details-impact-of-christmas-bombing-on-911-systems/
[25] Urgent Communications, “Tennessee board reports Nashville bombing impact on 911, future plans,” May 21, 2021. https://urgentcomm.com/911/tennessee-board-reports-nashville-bombing-impact-on-911-future-plans
[26] APCO International, Public Safety Communications, “Nashville Christmas Bombing: Lessons Learned,” August 15, 2021. https://www.apcointl.org/psc/nashville-christmas-bombing-lessons-learned/
[27] FOX 9, report on 911 service for Sprint customers in the Twin Cities after the Omaha fire, December 2016. https://www.fox9.com/news/911-service-restored-for-sprint-customers-in-metro-area
[28] 3 News Now (KMTV), report on the Sprint outage and 911 in Omaha, December 2016. https://www.3newsnow.com/news/local-news/sprint-outage-impacts-911
[29] Star Tribune, “CenturyLink weaknesses faulted in Minnesota 911 outage,” June 8, 2019. https://www.startribune.com/centurylink-weaknesses-faulted-in-minnesota-911-outage/510984822
[30] Government Technology, “Widespread Minnesota 911 Malfunction Blamed on Bad Card,” January 13, 2021. https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Widespread-Minnesota-911-Malfunction-Blamed-on-Bad-Card.html
[31] Associated Press via Standard-Examiner, “Light pole installation hits fiber line, knocks out 911 service in several states,” April 18, 2024. https://www.standard.net/top-headlines/2024/apr/18/light-pole-installation-hits-fiber-line-knocks-out-911-service-in-several-states/
[32] Cowboy State Daily, “Broken Fiber Line In Park County Exposes Fragility In Wyoming’s 911 System,” January 7, 2026. https://cowboystatedaily.com/2026/01/07/broken-fiber-line-in-park-county-exposes-fragility-in-wyomings-911-system
[33] KTVQ, “911 service restored in northern Wyoming after fiber line vandalism,” January 9, 2026. https://www.ktvq.com/neighborhood-news/northern-wyoming/911-service-restored-in-northern-wyoming-after-fiber-line-vandalism
[34] Economics and Technology, Inc., for the California Public Utilities Commission, Examination of the Local Telecommunications Networks and Related Policies and Practices of AT&T California and Frontier California, chapter 10, “Assessment of Safety, Redundancy and Resiliency of Network(s): Frontier,” 2019 (public version per D.20-12-021). https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/communications-division/documents/network-exam-documents/network-exam-ch-10-redundancy-resiliency-frontrpublic-per-d2012021redacted.pdf
[35] National 911 Program, California Office of Emergency Services NG911 Lessons Learned Report, November 7, 2022. https://www.911.gov/assets/National-911-Program_CalOES-Lessons-Learned-Report_7NOV2022_Final.pdf
[36] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-1068. https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=86-1068
[37] Nebraska next generation 911 service contractor, State of NE 911 diversity audit (2Q24 snapshot), filed with the Legislature November 14, 2024. https://www.nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/108/PDF/Agencies/Next-Generation_911_Service_Contractor/855_20241114-094126.pdf
[38] Nebraska Public Service Commission, 2022 Annual Report on Telecommunications. https://psc.nebraska.gov/sites/psc.nebraska.gov/files/doc/FINAL2022AnnualReportonTelecommunicationsFINAL2022-29-08.pdf
[39] Nebraska Public Service Commission, Application No. C-4347, order on Nebraska Public Power District’s dark fiber lease to Pinpoint Communications, entered May 17, 2011. https://www.nebraska.gov/psc/orders/telecom/C-4347.pdf
[40] Grant Schulte, “Towers and cable: These specialists help keep OPPD connected,” The Wire (Omaha Public Power District), June 1, 2026. https://oppdthewire.com/towers-and-cable-these-specialists-help-keep-oppd-connected/
[41] Nebraska Department of Transportation, RFP 126331 Z6, Fiber Optic Cable Repair Services, Attachment B, fiber inventory. https://dot.nebraska.gov/media/exsbxlne/126331-z6-attachment-b-fiber-inventory.pdf
[42] Hamilton Telecommunications, About. https://hamiltontel.com/about/
[43] NTIA, Broadband Technology Opportunities Program fact sheet, NebraskaLink, LLC. https://www2.ntia.doc.gov/sites/default/files/grantees/fact_sheet_-_nebraskalink.pdf
[44] Randy Bias, “The History of Pets vs Cattle and How to Use the Analogy Properly,” Cloudscaling. https://cloudscaling.com/blog/cloud-computing/the-history-of-pets-vs-cattle/
[45] Montana Public Radio, “Flathead County 911 Suffers Thursday Morning Outage,” November 9, 2017. https://www.mtpr.org/montana-news/2017-11-09/flathead-county-911-suffers-thursday-morning-outage
[46] Nebraska State Purchasing Bureau, RFP 202691101 solicitation page (bidders and documents). https://das.nebraska.gov/materiel/purchasing/RFP%20202691101/RFP%20202691101.html
[47] Nebraska State Purchasing Bureau, notice of intent to award, RFP 202691101, July 30, 2026. https://das.nebraska.gov/materiel/purchasing/RFP%20202691101/2026.7.30%20911%20RFP%20Intent%20to%20Award.docx
[48] Lumen, response to RFP 202691101, Technical File 1 of 4, section 3.1. https://das.nebraska.gov/materiel/purchasing/RFP%20202691101/202691101%20Lumen%20Technical%20File%201%20of%204.pdf
[49] FCC, “FCC Modernizes Next Generation 911 Reliability and Interoperability,” news release, June 25, 2026. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-422582A1.pdf
[50] 47 CFR § 4.9, Outage reporting requirements, threshold criteria (Legal Information Institute). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/47/4.9
[51] Indiana Statewide 911 Board, IN911 Network Overview. https://in911.net/network-overview.html
[52] Starlink, business service plans, prices shown November 17, 2026. https://starlink.com/business/service-plans
[53] Tanner Lee, HighSpeedInternet.com, “Our Starlink Business internet review,” August 7, 2026. https://www.highspeedinternet.com/providers/starlink/business
[54] Rich Miller, Data Center Knowledge, “Cable Cut Cited in Silicon Valley Outage,” April 9, 2009. https://datacenterknowledge.com/cables/cable-cut-cited-in-silicon-valley-outage
[55] ARRL, “When Vandals Strike Infrastructure, Hams Provide Communications Support,” April 15, 2009. https://www.arrl.org/news/when-vandals-strike-infrastructure-hams-provide-communications-support
[56] InfoWorld, “Sandy slams mobile, wired and cable networks as far west as Michigan,” October 30, 2012. https://www.infoworld.com/article/2280967/sandy-slams-mobile-wired-and-cable-networks-as-far-west-as-michigan-2.html
[57] California Public Utilities Commission, Safety and Enforcement Division, Incident Investigation Report, Incident No. E20130416-01, PG&E Metcalf Transmission Substation, June 24, 2013 (in PG&E’s January 30, 2015 filing, A.13-12-012). https://files.cpuc.ca.gov/PG&E20150130ResponseToA1312012Ruling/2014/02/SB_GT&S_0641100.pdf
[58] Teresa Hansen, Renewable Energy World, “Wellinghoff Nailed it: PG&E Substation Attack is Terrorism,” May 14, 2014. https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/?p=8079817165
[59] CBS San Francisco and Bay City News Service, “Vandalism At San Jose PG&E Substation Called ‘Sabotage’,” April 16, 2013. https://www.cbsnews.com/sanfrancisco/news/gunshots-cause-oil-spill-at-san-jose-pge-substation
[60] FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, March 8th, 2017 AT&T VoLTE 911 Outage Report and Recommendations, PS Docket No. 17-68, May 2017. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-344941A1.pdf
[61] Telecommunications Law Professionals, “FCC Settles 911 Reliability Investigations with 4 Carriers,” December 20, 2021. https://www.tlp.law/2021/12/20/fcc-settles-911-reliability-investigations-with-4-carriers/
[62] Nebraska Public Service Commission, “Service Restored to 911 Centers Impacted by Windstream Outage,” September 3, 2023. https://psc.nebraska.gov/node/1496
[63] Nebraska Public Service Commission, “PSC Opens Investigations into 911 Outages,” 2023. https://psc.nebraska.gov/for-consumers/psc-opens-investigations-911-outages
[64] Noah Crenshaw, Daily Journal (Franklin, Indiana), “Indiana State Treasurer: 911 outage was caused by server disruptions,” December 18, 2023. https://dailyjournal.net/2023/12/18/indiana-state-treasurer-911-outage-was-caused-by-server-disruptions/
[65] FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, February 22, 2024 AT&T Mobility Network Outage Report and Findings, July 22, 2024. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-404150A1.pdf
[66] Associated Press via KIOS, “Telecom Outage Disrupts 911 Service Across IA,” May 31, 2024. https://www.kios.org/news/2024-05-31/telecom-outage-disrupts-911-service-across-ia
[67] Iowa Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, “Interruption to 911 landline services reported throughout Iowa,” May 30, 2024. https://homelandsecurity.iowa.gov/hsem-news/2024-05-30/interruption-911-landline-services-reported-throughout-iowa
[68] Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, “Massachusetts State 911 Department Determined Firewall Caused Statewide 911 Disruption,” June 19, 2024. https://www.mass.gov/news/massachusetts-state-911-department-determined-firewall-caused-statewide-911-disruption
[69] 3 News Now (KMTV), “Lumen says a ‘fiber cut’ led to 911 disruptions in Southeast Nebraska counties,” May 29, 2025. https://www.3newsnow.com/news/local-news/lumen-says-a-fiber-cut-led-to-911-disruptions-in-southeast-nebraska-counties
[70] Associated Press via WTOP, “AT&T attributes mass 911 outages in 3 states to fiber cuts made by ‘third parties’,” September 26, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20251008091618/https://wtop.com/national/2025/09/att-attributes-mass-911-outages-in-3-states-to-fiber-cuts-made-by-third-parties/
[71] FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, “Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Seeks Information on Effects of January 2026 Verizon Outage on Wireless Service Consumers, Public Safety Entities, and Government Entities,” Public Notice DA 26-94, PS Docket No. 26-21, January 28, 2026. https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-94A1.pdf
[72] Jake Neenan, Broadband Breakfast, “Verizon Says Major Outage Caused by ‘Software Issue’,” January 20, 2026. https://broadbandbreakfast.com/verizon-says-major-outage-caused-by-software-issue/
[73] Stephanie Weaver, FOX 5 DC, “Verizon outage: Users report stuck in SOS mode,” January 14, 2026. https://www.fox5dc.com/news/verizon-outage-users-report-stuck-sos-mode
[74] Stateline, “FCC adopts new rules as states transition to Next Generation 911,” June 26, 2026. https://stateline.org/2026/06/26/fcc-adopts-new-rules-as-states-transition-to-next-generation-911/
[75] KIRO 7, “911 service restored after Washington experiences statewide outage,” June 16, 2026. https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/911-service-restored-after-washington-experiences-statewide-outage/ZAWGQMPU2JC4ZEL5R7KMORPDS4/
[76] MPR News, “Outage at Minneapolis data center behind last week’s telecommunications disruptions,” August 10, 2026. https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/08/10/how-an-outage-at-unassuming-building-in-minneapolis-sent-waves-through-the-midwest
[77] Regina Medina, MPR News, “Flights resume at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport after ‘telecommunication issues’,” August 6, 2026. https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/08/06/flights-halted-at-minneapolisst-paul-international-airport

